Categorizing Chevron by Hickman, Kristin E. & Hahn, R. David
Categorizing Chevron 
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN* & R. DAVID HAHN † 
What is the Chevron doctrine? Everyone knows Chevron as a doctrine 
that has governed judicial review of agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes for more than thirty years. Yet courts and 
commentators continue to disagree over how the doctrine works and 
what it requires courts to do. Contributing to the disagreement is a 
categorization problem: Is Chevron a standard of review, a rule of 
decision, or a canon of construction? Most cases in which courts might 
apply Chevron can be resolved without answering that question, but 
some cannot. Two recent debates about Chevron particularly raise the 
categorization issue: whether the government can waive or forfeit 
Chevron deference, and also whether or under what circumstances the 
Supreme Court might overturn Chevron notwithstanding stare decisis. 
This article contemplates Chevron’s categorization and the 
implications of each alternative before explaining why Chevron is best 
considered a standard of review. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Chevron doctrine is ubiquitous. All lawyers, and a fair number of 
nonlawyers, know about it.1 In the case of Chevron, however, knowing of the 
doctrine really only gets a person so far. Broadly, Chevron calls for courts to 
defer to reasonable interpretations2 of ambiguous statutory provisions offered 
by the administering agency in formats carrying the force of law. Sometimes, 
applying that doctrine is straight forward. In other instances, it is not.3 
In describing the courts’ role in reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute, the Supreme Court in Chevron counseled that a reviewing court first 
 
 1 The Chevron doctrine has been discussed in multiple mainstream publications in the 
past few years. See, e.g., Tyler Olson, In Supreme Court Dissent, Thomas Cites Thomas in 
Arguing to Overturn Decision Authored by Thomas, FOX NEWS (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/in-dissent-thomas-cites-thomas-arguing-court-should-
overrule-decision-authored-by-thomas [https://perma.cc/7PLV-4WF7]; Jeremy W. Peters, 
Trump’s New Judicial Litmus Test: Shrinking ‘the Administrative State’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/us/politics/trump-judges-courts-admini 
strative-state.html [https://perma.cc/UEU7-Y7VC]; Jeffrey Pojanowski, The Curveball in 
the Gorsuch Nomination, CNN (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/02/opinions 
/curveball-in-gorsuch-nomination-pojanowski/index.html [https://perma.cc/JXR5-84FX]; 
George F. Will, Opinion, Gorsuch Strikes a Blow for Constitutional Equilibrium, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/gorsuch-strikes-a-blow-
for-constitutional-equilibrium/2018/04/20/78139ef6-43f2-11e8-bba2-0976a82b05a2 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/G7BB-FUHN]. 
 2 We recognize the extensive literature distinguishing the concepts of interpretation 
and construction for statutes, the Constitution, and otherwise. See generally, e.g., Randy E. 
Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011); Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010); 
Lawrence B. Solum & Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Chevron As Construction, 105 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1465 (2020); Peter M. Tiersma, The Ambiguity of Interpretation: Distinguishing 
Interpretation from Construction, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1095 (1995). Although we find this 
literature insightful and not incompatible with our thesis, for the most part, we regard it as 
tangential to our project. The Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence uses the terms 
interchangeably. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 986 (2005); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 
(1992); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
For purposes of this article, we do the same.  
 3 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44; see also, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 226–27 (2001) (announcing that only agency pronouncements carrying legal force are 
eligible for Chevron deference). 
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should undertake its own inquiry into the statute’s meaning.4 “First, always, is 
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, 
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.”5 So far, so good—evaluating statutory meaning is not easy, but it 
is what courts do, whether or not an agency is involved. In a footnote to this 
passage, the Court even instructed judges to use “traditional tools of statutory 
construction” to ascertain congressional intent, much as they have always done.6  
A more controversial aspect of the Chevron doctrine derives from what the 
Court said next.  
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction 
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.7  
The Court went on to describe statutory ambiguities as delegations of authority 
to make policy and to contend that, “[i]n such a case, a court may not substitute 
its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made 
by the administrator of an agency.”8  
Decades after the Supreme Court decided Chevron, courts and 
commentators continue to disagree over how Chevron works and what it 
requires courts to do. How ambiguous must a statute be before courts shift into 
a deferential posture,9 and what makes an interpretation reasonable, and thus 
worthy of deference?10 On its face, Chevron has two steps, but some argue the 
 
 4 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 843 n.9. 
 7 Id. at 843 (footnotes omitted). 
 8 Id. at 844. 
 9 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511, 520–21 (“How clear is clear? It is here, if Chevron is not abandoned, that the 
future battles over acceptance of agency interpretations of law will be fought.”); Brett M. 
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2137–38 (2016) 
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (Oxford Univ. Press 2014)) (noting 
that judges observe clarity thresholds ranging from 55–45 to 90–10). 
 10 Scalia, supra note 9, at 521 (observing that different approaches to statutory 
interpretation will yield different perceptions regarding the “range of ‘reasonable’ 
interpretation[s] that the agency may adopt and to which the courts must pay deference”). 
See also generally Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure, and Process: Agency Duties of 
Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313 (1996) (making the case for a 
narrow Chevron step two focused purely on statutory interpretation outcomes); Ronald M. 
Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997) 
(surveying different approaches to the reasonableness inquiry and advocating in favor of a 
combination with State Farm arbitrariness or reasoned decisionmaking analysis). 
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two steps are really one,11 plus the Court added a step zero many years ago,12 
leading still others to contend we should add even more steps, or maybe already 
have.13  
Chevron has always been controversial,14 but lately the criticism has been 
amplified significantly.15 To its critics, the Chevron doctrine has become the 
Frankenstein’s monster of administrative law: a hideous “behemoth” that has 
escaped its restraints and is wreaking havoc on its creator, the courts, the 
Constitution, and the American public.16 By this account, Chevron routinely 
forces judges to defer to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes, and 
thus requires courts to abdicate their judicial role and power.17 
 
 11 Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 
VA. L. REV. 597, 597–98 (2009) (explaining the one-step Chevron); see also United States 
v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, 
Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 599 (2009)). 
 12 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (adopting the standard 
that has been labeled step zero); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (coining the term); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191–94 (2006) (identifying and analyzing Mead’s 
step zero). 
 13 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1339, 1339, 1361–63 (2017) (mapping an entire “staircase” of “interstitial steps” within 
Chevron analysis); Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 
U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 758–60 (2017) (counting all of Chevron’s potential steps). 
 14 For just a few of the many articles criticizing Chevron over the years, see Christopher 
Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 DUKE L.J. 
561, 587–88 (describing Chevron as “the Supreme Court’s conceptually flawed effort to 
control the inclinations of some lower court judges to impose their politically unaccountable, 
unreconstructed New Deal prejudices to push the bureaucracy toward an aggressive 
regulatory stance”); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in 
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (describing Chevron as “a 
siren’s song, seductive but treacherous” as it changes the allocation of power among the 
federal government’s branches); Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public 
Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 678–80 (2007) (suggesting that Chevron misunderstands agencies’ 
“operational, policy-implementing role”). 
 15 See, e.g., Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 691–94 (2020) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“Chevron is in serious tension with the Constitution, 
the [Administrative Procedure Act], and over 100 years of judicial decisions.”); Michael 
Kagan, Loud and Soft Anti-Chevron Decisions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37, 47–49 (2018) 
(highlighting recent Supreme Court opinions that are either openly or covertly critical of 
Chevron). 
 16 See generally MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (Penguin Classics 2003). 
 17 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Chevron deference precludes judges from exercising [independent] judgment, forcing 
them to abandon what they believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous statute’ in favor of 
an agency’s construction.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron step two tells us we must allow an executive 
agency to resolve the meaning of any ambiguous statutory provision. In this way, Chevron 
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Underlying and perhaps even driving some of the angst and rancor is 
disagreement over exactly what kind of legal doctrine Chevron is. To some, 
Chevron operates as a rule of decision that dictates case outcomes, forcing 
courts to decide cases contrary to their own perceptions of what the law 
requires.18 Indeed, some of Chevron’s harshest critics seem to view Chevron 
this way, undoubtedly at least in part because the Supreme Court at times has 
used mandatory rhetoric in describing the doctrine’s application.19 Others think 
of Chevron as a standard of review—a judicial “mood” that affects how parties 
structure their arguments and how a court perceives its role vis-à-vis agencies, 
but that is flexible and not so outcome determinative.20 Finally, still others have 
suggested that Chevron more closely resembles a canon of statutory 
interpretation, with the Supreme Court conducting its own statutory inquiry and 
treating the agency’s interpretation more as a “plus factor” to justify an 
interpretive result.21 By that view, Chevron may be regarded as merely one of 
many tools that guide but do not dictate judicial analysis of statutory language.22  
So which characterization of Chevron is correct? And does the question 
even matter?  
Depending on the case and the context, Chevron may well fit into any or 
even all of the above-described categories. These categories—rule of decision, 
standard of review, and canon of statutory interpretation or construction—are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive.23 The labels sometimes mean different 
things to different people, so the contours of each category are hard to define. 
Even as defined, the boundaries of each category are fuzzy and may overlap. 
Still, at least as described by this article, each category represents a distinct 
doctrinal concept that carries its own set of first principles. Those principles can 
 
seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty.”), vacated, 
In re Gutierrez Brizuela, 2018 WL 1756899 (2018); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW UNLAWFUL? 315–16 (2014); cf. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing a trend of “reflexive deference” in the circuit courts). 
 18 See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A 
Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 
1348–49 (2018) (synthesizing the results of interviews with circuit court judges, some of 
whom felt forced to follow Chevron despite their skepticism of its approach). 
 19 See infra Part II.A. 
 20 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (comparing a 
standard of review to a “mood”); see also infra Part II.B. 
 21 See infra Part II.C. 
 22 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) 
(instructing reviewing courts to ascertain congressional intent at Chevron step one using 
“traditional tools of statutory construction”). 
 23 Maureen Callahan has suggested additionally that Chevron could be a “rule of 
abstention in favor of another governmental decisionmaker” in a manner akin to “prudential 
limitations on justiciability in the federal courts.” Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts 
Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1289. Although interesting, 
Callahan’s characterization has not gained the same traction as the three discussed in this 
article, so we will leave considering it for another day.  
616 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:4 
provide a theoretical starting point when confronting certain questions about the 
Chevron doctrine. 
Also, in many cases, how we categorize the Chevron doctrine may not 
matter very much. Courts often find agency statutory interpretations clearly 
“right” or clearly “wrong” at Chevron step one,24 or they otherwise signal that 
they would either uphold or reject the agency’s interpretation irrespective of 
Chevron.25  
In certain instances, however, how we characterize Chevron could matter a 
lot. Two prominent (and, at present, hotly debated) examples come readily to 
mind.  
The first is an emerging issue that is dividing circuit court judges and has 
attracted the attention of Justice Gorsuch as well: whether the government can 
waive or forfeit Chevron deference.26 Some judges conceive of Chevron as the 
sort of legal argument that agencies must raise and even argue at some length in 
order to preserve, and an agency’s failure to do so in briefing obviates the court’s 
need to consider the Chevron doctrine at all.27 But some legal doctrines and 
 
 24 See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018) (deciding against the 
agency at step one); Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., 566 U.S. 93, 113 n.12 (2012) (deciding in 
favor of the agency at step one); see also Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in 
the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32–34 (2017) (finding that federal circuit courts 
resolved 30% of Chevron applications from 2003 through 2013 at Chevron step one). 
 25 See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 (2015) (rejecting deference 
because the agency’s interpretation “makes scant sense”); Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. 
v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 544–45 (2008) (concluding that agency’s 
interpretation was right without addressing belated claim to Chevron deference); WildEarth 
Guardians v. U.S. EPA, 728 F.3d 1075, 1082 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding the agency’s 
interpretation “persuasive” regardless of the standard applied). 
 26 See Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 
790 (2020) (mem.) (statement of Gorsuch, J.) (“This Court has often declined to apply 
Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it.”); Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 
903 F.3d 1154, 1161 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (recognizing active circuit split over 
whether Chevron deference can be waived); see also infra Part III.A. 
 27 See, e.g., Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 893–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding 
that an agency had “forfeited any claims to Chevron deference” by making only a “nominal[] 
reference[]” to Chevron in its brief); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Erskine, 512 
F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he [agency] waived any reliance on Chevron deference 
by failing to raise it to the district court.”); see also Aposhian v. Barr, 958 F.3d 969, 998 
(10th Cir. 2020) (Carson, J., dissenting) (objecting to the application of Chevron when the 
government disavowed reliance on it). See generally Jeremy D. Rozansky, Comment, 
Waiving Chevron, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1927 (2018) (discussing the prospect that agencies can 
waive Chevron deference by not affirmatively raising it or by intentionally abandoning it). 
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arguments—like standards of review28 and canons of statutory 
interpretation29—cannot be waived or forfeited. So what is Chevron?  
The second question is more fundamental: should the Court overturn 
Chevron? Some of Chevron’s critics have called for Chevron to be overruled,30 
and several Supreme Court Justices seem amenable to the notion.31 Whether the 
Court overturns Chevron could depend at least in part on its perception of how 
principles of stare decisis might apply. In turn, how stare decisis applies may 
depend upon how one categorizes Chevron.32  
Our goal with this article is to explore these alternative characterizations of 
the Chevron doctrine, and some of the implications of each. We ultimately 
propose that, when it matters, Chevron is best understood as a standard of 
review. We acknowledge the limitations of our framing and we do not ignore or 
deny that some aspects and judicial applications of Chevron make the doctrine 
seem in some instances more like a rule of decision or a canon of interpretation. 
But we do suggest that framing Chevron as a standard of review should affect 
how one perceives its characteristics. And we argue that Chevron is an evolving 
 
 28 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(citing several circuits for “parties ‘cannot waive the proper standard of review by failing to 
argue it’”) (citation omitted); Ward v. Stephens, 777 F.3d 250, 257 n.3 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing 
decisions from several circuits for the proposition that “[a] party cannot waive, concede, or 
abandon the applicable standard of review”), abrogated on other grounds by Ayestas v. 
Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080 (2018). 
 29 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 
1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“We, for example, would give no mind to a litigant’s 
failure to invoke canons such as expressio unius or constitutional avoidance even if she 
intentionally left them out of her brief.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) (mem.); cf. 
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is 
properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by 
the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper 
construction of governing law.”). 
 30 See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron 
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782 (2010); 
Ronald A. Cass, Vive La Deference?: Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and 
Judicial Discretion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1300–01, 1328–29 (2015); Richard W. 
Murphy, Abandon Chevron and Modernize Stare Decisis for the Administrative State, 69 
ALA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2017). 
 31 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring), 
vacated, In re Gutierrez Brizuela, No. AXXX XX3 099, 2018 WL 1756899 (B.I.A. Jan. 4, 
2018); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in 
part) (contending that the Supreme Court’s decision not to overturn Auer deference does not 
preclude reconsideration of Chevron); Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448–49 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with Chief Justice Roberts, with Justice Alito joining). 
 32 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1765 
(2010) (“[T]he Court does not give stare decisis to any statements of statutory interpretation 
methodology.”) (footnote omitted); see also infra Part III.B. 
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judicial construction of the APA § 706(2)(A) arbitrary and capricious standard, 
which is unquestionably a standard of review. 
This article proceeds in three Parts. Part II describes the parameters of our 
categories and how Chevron’s characteristics make it resemble alternatively a 
rule of decision, a canon of construction, and a standard of review. Part III 
considers why categorizing Chevron may be helpful in evaluating the 
contemporary issues of whether Chevron can be waived or forfeited and whether 
Chevron should be overturned. Part IV makes the case that Chevron is best 
understood primarily as a standard of review. 
II. CATEGORICAL ALTERNATIVES 
Categorizing Chevron first requires defining the parameters and 
characteristics of the alternatives: rule of decision, standard of review, and 
canon of construction. The task is complicated by the fact that the categories 
themselves are flexible in their meaning. At first blush, the labels sometimes 
conjure up different ideas for different people, some of which are overlapping 
or simply muddle the categories with one another. This difficulty does not 
render the categories meaningless. As described below, all three are well 
understood in contemporary jurisprudence and academic literature. Still, to 
avoid confusion, some explication of the categories is necessary, along with 
explanation of how Chevron would appear to fall within each.  
A. Rule of Decision 
In our system of judicial review and its resolution of disputes, some 
questions are primary, conclusively determining legal rights and obligations or 
the legal consequences of past or future behavior. Other questions are 
secondary. They contribute to the process of judicial decisionmaking. They 
require their own doctrinal analysis. Their resolution may even be outcome 
determinative in a particular case. But they are not really what brought litigants 
to court in the first instance.  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “rule of decision” as “[a] rule, statute, 
body of law, or prior decision that provides the basis for deciding or adjudicating 
a case.”33 The definition’s allusion to the resolution of case outcomes suggests 
that it is limited to those primary questions that determine legal rights, 
obligations, or consequences.  
To be clear, a rule of decision need not be a bright line. The legal principles 
that courts apply to resolve disputes fall along a continuum of rules and 
 
 33 Rule of Decision, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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standards.34 The three-part balancing test adopted by Mathews v. Eldridge35 for 
evaluating whether an agency’s hearing procedures satisfy the Due Process 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution is no less a rule of decision for being a classic 
standard rather than a bright-line rule.36 Likewise, the logical outgrowth test for 
evaluating the adequacy of a notice of proposed rulemaking under 
Administrative Procedure Act § 553, which requires a court to decide “if 
interested parties should have anticipated [from the notice] that the change 
[between the proposed and final rules] was possible” is a standard.37  
Correspondingly, the fact that rules of decision often take the form of 
standards rather than bright-line rules means that courts and scholars will 
sometimes refer to them as standards of review, in the sense that they are 
standards that govern judicial decisionmaking. A key example comes from the 
doctrines for evaluating Equal Protection Clause claims, which are styled in 
terms of strict, intermediate, and rational basis scrutiny and represent the only 
real effort to operationalize that constitutional text.38  
Irrespective of whether they take the form of rules or standards, however, 
all of the above-described doctrines are judge-made from whole cloth—
construing and operationalizing, respectively, constitutional and statutory text 
that does not mention their terms.39 The key point is that, through applying those 
standards, and other decision rules like them, courts resolve complaints that 
government agencies have acted outside the boundaries of the law. And, in turn, 
 
 34 For just a few examples of the voluminous literature on rules and standards in law, 
see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
 35 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (evaluating the constitutionality 
of agency hearing procedures by weighing (1) “the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail”).  
 36 The constitutional theory literature sometimes speaks of the Supreme Court’s 
development of these standards in terms of metadoctrine or construction versus 
interpretation. See generally, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 
VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Solum, supra note 2.  
 37 Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 619 F.3d 235, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(describing the logical outgrowth test for determining compliance with APA § 553(b) and 
(c)); see, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1079–80 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (same); Miami-Dade Cty. v. U.S. EPA, 529 F.3d 1049, 1058–59 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(same).  
 38 See, e.g., Cain Norris & Whitney Turk, Equal Protection, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & LAW 
397, 400–07 (2013) (describing the tiers of equal protection analysis). 
 39 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 36, at 64–78 (describing judge-made operational rules). 
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these decision rules guide the primary behavior of government actors. It is for 
this reason that all of these doctrines represent rules of decision. 
In the realm of statutory interpretation, as the Black’s Law definition 
suggests, the statute itself at least theoretically provides the basis for resolving 
legal rights, obligations, and consequences. Yet, statutes frequently fail at first 
glance to answer statutory questions.40 Courts routinely bring to bear different 
interpretive methods, tools, and—yes—deference doctrines to help them glean 
congressional intent and resolve questions of statutory meaning.41 Those 
methods, tools, and doctrines are not specific to any one interpretive question or 
statute, but rather are generally applicable across a wide range of statutes and 
subject matters.42 Consequently, in the statutory interpretation context, it may 
be more accurate to say that whether a particular doctrine speaks to primary as 
opposed to secondary decisionmaking—that is, whether a doctrine is a rule of 
decision—depends upon whether that doctrine is itself binding, conclusive, and 
outcome determinative. 
Chevron has several features that could support its categorization as a rule 
of decision in this vein. Courts and commentators frequently use mandatory 
rhetoric to describe Chevron.43 Some opinions of the Supreme Court and of 
individual Justices present and apply Chevron in a manner that allows the 
doctrine to be cast as relatively rote in its application and predictable in its 
outcomes.44 Finally, empirical work has shown that lower court judges feel 
bound in their decisionmaking by Chevron,45 in a manner reminiscent of a rule 
of decision.  
 
 40 Cf. Robert A. Katzmann, Response to Judge Kavanaugh’s Review of Judging 
Statutes, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 388, 388 (2016) (observing that judges can disagree over 
“how to proceed when, as is often the case, the statute defies easy comprehension, when 
something less than clarity reigns”). 
 41 See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 70, 71–76 (2006) (comparing textualism and purposivism as interpretive 
methods); Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory 
Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. 
REV. 71, 80–89 (2018) (describing textual and substantive canons and their justifications, 
including by reference to legislative supremacy and congressional preference); see also 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (justifying 
deference as a means of honoring Congress’s delegation of authority to agencies). 
 42 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword, Law as 
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66–67 (1994) (explaining that interpretive regimes and 
canons of construction can function as “off-the-rack” tools when interpreting ambiguous 
statutes). 
 43 See infra Part II.A.1. 
 44 See Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 537–
41 (2014).  
 45 Gluck & Posner, supra note 18, at 1348–49. 
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1. Chevron’s Mandatory Rhetoric 
Mandatory language pervades both courts’ analyses and scholarly 
discussions surrounding Chevron. Justice Stevens’ opinion in Chevron itself 
used mandatory language, declaring that a court “may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”46 The Supreme Court often has counseled that, 
once a reviewing court establishes that Chevron applies and that the underlying 
statute is ambiguous regarding the statutory question presented, the court “must 
defer” to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.47 Other cases use 
different rhetorical formulations, with words like “required”48 or “obligated,”49 
but the implication is the same.  
Such rhetoric may undermine the notion that Chevron is merely a 
framework or tool for evaluating and discerning congressional intent and 
statutory meaning. Instead, mandatory terms like “shall,” “must,” and “may not” 
draw the attention of reviewing courts toward the end result, which in turn may 
diminish the importance of robust and independent judicial analysis in favor of 
more pro forma findings of ambiguity.50 Such a supposed potential effect on 
judicial psychology is of course speculative, but it seems to play out in some 
real cases. 
In Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., for example, the Supreme Court was 
confronted with whether new regulations were “more restrictive than” previous 
regulations for evaluating claims to black lung benefits, and thus contrary to 
 
 46 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (emphasis added). 
 47 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) 
(emphasis added) (“[A]t the second step the court must defer to the agency’s interpretation 
if it is ‘reasonable.’”) (subsequent history omitted); Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 
S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (“[I]f the law does not speak clearly to the question at issue, a court 
must defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation, rather than substitute its own reading.”); 
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (“[W]hen the statute ‘is silent or ambiguous’ 
we must defer to a reasonable construction by the agency charged with its implementation.”); 
see also Gluck & Posner, supra note 18, at 1345 (describing Chevron as the “interpretive 
rule that courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes”). 
 48 Beth Rochel Seminary v. Bennett, 825 F.2d 478, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[W]e are 
required to defer to the Department’s permissible construction of the Act.”).  
 49 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2122 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder 
Chevron we are obligated to defer to a Government agency’s interpretation of the statute that 
it administers so long as that interpretation is a permissible one.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 50 See, e.g., id. at 2120–21 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (accusing circuit courts of a “type 
of reflexive deference” with only “cursory analysis of the questions whether, applying the 
ordinary tools of statutory construction, Congress’ intent could be discerned, and whether 
the [agency’s] interpretation was reasonable”) (internal citation omitted); E. Garrett West, A 
Youngstown for the Administrative State, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 660–61 (2018) 
(identifying Chevron as a standard of review but claiming that Chevron provides a “rule of 
decision for situations when the statute yields no clear answer”).  
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statutory requirements.51 After summarizing the case background and circuit 
court disagreement,52 Justice Blackmun did not employ any of the traditional 
tools for evaluating statutory meaning but rather launched directly into a 
summary of the statute’s “complex and highly technical regulatory program,” 
the agency’s expertise, and the Court’s deferential posture.53 He acknowledged 
that the challengers’ “parsing of these impenetrable regulations would be 
consistent with accepted canons of construction,” but maintained “that the 
Secretary’s interpretation need not be the best or most natural one by 
grammatical or others standards.”54 He even called it “axiomatic” that “the 
Secretary’s view need be only reasonable to warrant deference.”55  
In the face of precedents like this one, it is hardly surprising that lower 
courts absorbed a message that Chevron demanded them to subordinate their 
judgment to that of agencies. In a recent survey by Judge Richard Posner and 
Prof. Abbe Gluck, a majority of federal appellate judges reported that they had 
deferred under Chevron when they did not want to do so.56 As one judge 
responded, “I apply [Chevron] because I don’t see any way out of it.”57 
Even when the Court evaluates the statute for itself and rejects the agency’s 
interpretation, it often couches its refusal to defer in terms that make Chevron 
as a doctrine seem like a rejected alternative—notwithstanding the doctrine’s 
specific inclusion of judicial analysis of statutory clarity at Chevron step one. 
For example, in Pereira v. Sessions, the Court considered whether a document 
that fails to specify the time or place of a noncitizen’s removal proceedings can 
be a “notice to appear” under the relevant statutory provision.58 Concluding that 
such a document would not meet the statutory requirements, the Court noted 
that it “need not resort to Chevron deference,” suggesting that the Court’s 
interpretive result precluded application of a Chevron “rule.”59 Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira noted discomfort with that possibility, 
accusing the lower courts of conducting only a “cursory analysis” of Chevron’s 
two steps.60 Suggesting that Chevron is an alternative to independent judicial 
analysis, as opposed to incorporating independent judicial analysis, fosters the 
perception that Chevron is a rule of decision the Court need not always address, 
rather than a framework or tool that guides judicial review without dictating a 
particular outcome.  
 
 51 See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 695 (1991). 
 52 Id. at 690–92. 
 53 Id. at 695–97. 
 54 Id. at 702. 
 55 Id.  
 56 Gluck & Posner, supra note 18, at 1348–49. 
 57 Id. at 1349. 
 58 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018).  
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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2. “Decision Tree” Applications 
As noted, rules of decision can be flexible standards rather than bright 
lines.61 Nevertheless, the more a doctrine seems to operate like a bright line rule, 
the more conclusive and outcome determinative it may seem. Chevron has often 
been characterized as more rule-like than other doctrines governing judicial 
review.62 The Court’s mandatory rhetoric, as well as the routine portrayal of 
Chevron in terms of steps, make Chevron susceptible to that characterization.63  
Complementing Chevron’s mandatory rhetoric, many judicial opinions 
seem to approach Chevron analysis in the manner of a “decision tree” that 
magnifies the impression of Chevron as rule-like, binding, and outcome 
determinative.64 Chevron is well known for its two steps. Again, the first asks 
whether the meaning of the statute is clear, for if it is, then “that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”65 If the statute is ambiguous, 
however, then Chevron instructs the reviewing court to ask whether the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute is permissible or reasonable.66 As the Court 
articulated in United States v. Mead Corp., Chevron only applies when Congress 
has delegated to the interpreting agency the authority to act with the force of law 
and the agency, in articulating its interpretation, intended to exercise such 
delegated power.67  
In theory, one thus can cast Mead and Chevron as requiring a sequence of 
separate, and relatively mechanical, “yes or no” inquiries:  
 
1. Did Congress give the agency the authority to bind regulated parties 
with the force and effect of law?68 If so, 
2. Did the agency exercise that authority when it adopted the 
interpretation at issue?69 If so, 
 
 61 See supra notes 34–42 and accompanying text (describing generally the rule of 
decision category). 
 62 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules 
and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 808 (2002) (characterizing Chevron as “more 
rule-like” than “the more standard-like Skidmore” doctrine); Connor N. Raso & William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates 
Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1735, 1813 (2010) 
(describing Chevron as “formalist” and “rule-like” in contrast to the Skidmore standard). 
 63 See Merrill, supra note 62, at 809–10 (concluding that Chevron’s steps make it seem 
rule-like because each step is “defined in terms of the examination of a single variable”). 
 64 See Hickman, supra note 44, at 537–41 (describing the decision tree approach to 
Chevron review). 
 65 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 66 Id. at 843–44. 
 67 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).  
 68 See Hickman, supra note 44, at 539 (reflecting this decision tree model of Mead and 
Chevron pictorially). 
 69 Id. 
624 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:4 
3. Is the statute ambiguous?70 If so, 
4. Is the agency’s interpretation based on a permissible construction 
of the statute? If so, defer.71 
 
Each of these inquiries may be open-ended and flexible. Judges and 
administrative law scholars debate endlessly, for example, what it means for 
agency action to carry the force of law,72 how clear is clear enough for 
Chevron’s first step,73 and which tools to take into account in evaluating 
clarity.74 Each step thus represents both a range of possible considerations and 
an avenue for potential judicial disagreement. But the mere fact that Chevron 
can be reduced to such a seemingly-mechanical framework gives it a strong 
whiff of blunt predictability and conclusiveness. 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Compare, e.g., Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 58–61 (2d Cir. 
2004) (concluding that a HUD policy statement was eligible for Chevron deference), with 
Krzalic v. Republic Tile Co., 314 F.3d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 2002) (reaching the opposite 
conclusion). For further discussion, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled 
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1459–64 (2005) (describing 
inconsistent approaches to the force of law inquiry in the circuit courts); Kristin E. Hickman, 
Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 510–25 (2013) (documenting debates 
and disagreements over the force of law issue); Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, 
Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1016–17 (2005) (arguing 
that an agency action should only carry the force of law if “the agency commits to applying 
it uniformly across time and parties”). 
 73 Compare, e.g., Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45–46 (2002) 
(concluding that a statute was ambiguous because it was “silent” on the question before the 
Court and “d[id] not foreclose” the agency’s approach), with FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133–43 (2000) (analyzing statutory structure and purpose as 
well as history of congressional action and inaction at length in finding the statute “clear”), 
and MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–31 (1994) 
(concluding that an agency’s interpretation went “beyond the meaning that the statute [could] 
bear” by analyzing dictionary definitions as well as the structure and purpose of the statutory 
scheme). For further discussion, see Scalia, supra note 9, at 520–21 (“How clear is clear? It 
is here, if Chevron is not abandoned, that the future battles over acceptance of agency 
interpretations of law will be fought.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After 
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2091 (1990) (“Chevron does not say how ambiguous a 
statute must be in order for the agency view to control.”). 
 74 Compare, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. EPA, 793 F.3d 656, 665 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(considering legislative history at Chevron step one), and BNSF Ry. Co. v. United States, 
775 F.3d 743, 755 & n.87 (5th Cir. 2015) (same), with United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 
292 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[L]egislative history should not be considered at Chevron step one.”). 
For further analysis, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of 
Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 76–84 (2008) (discussing competing 
judicial approaches to the relationship between Chevron and substantive canons). 
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Several Supreme Court opinions exemplify the decision tree approach to 
Chevron analysis.75 In Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, for example, 
the Court considered a Federal Reserve Board regulation promulgated under the 
Truth in Lending Act (TILA).76 In a unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas, the 
Court first concluded that the agency had authority—via an express statutory 
delegation—to issue binding regulations interpreting TILA, which authority the 
agency obviously exercised by promulgating the regulation under challenge.77 
The Court then proceeded to Chevron’s two steps. After examining TILA’s text 
and structure, the Court found the statute ambiguous.78 The Court then 
proceeded to Chevron’s second step, examining the agency’s reasoning for its 
choice and finding the agency’s interpretation reasonable.79  
On at least some of the occasions when its analysis has followed this rather 
mechanical approach to Chevron analysis, the Court has seemed quick—
perhaps too quick—to conclude that a statutory provision is ambiguous and the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable. In Yellow Transportation, Inc. v. 
Michigan, for example, the Court offered shockingly little analysis in deferring 
to the agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute.80 The Court mentioned 
none of the usual tools of statutory interpretation, such as linguistic canons, 
dictionaries, or legislative history, in dispensing with Chevron’s first step, 
observing only that the provision at issue “d[id] not foreclose” the agency’s 
interpretation.81 The Court acknowledged the existence of multiple alternative 
readings of the provision, but again with seemingly little inquiry, the Court 
simply concluded that the agency’s choice was reasonable and deference was 
appropriate.82 To the extent the Court’s analysis follows this model and offers 
what appears to be a relatively pro forma analysis of the statute and agency 
reasoning,83 Chevron looks more like a rule of decision than a deferential 
standard. 
 
 75 See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53, 
58 (2011) (Roberts, C.J.); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517, 521 (2009) (Kennedy, J.); 
United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 316–17, 319–20 (2009) (Souter, J.); Nat’l Cable 
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005) (Thomas, J.); 
Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45–46 (2002) (O’Connor, J.).  
 76 Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 235 (2004). 
 77 Id. at 238. 
 78 Id. at 241–42. 
 79 Id. at 242–43. 
 80 Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45–46 (2002).  
 81 See id. at 45. 
 82 Id. at 45–46. 
 83 Of course, a judicial opinion may not fully articulate the entirety of a Justice’s 
decisionmaking process. A Justice might review statutory text, history, and purpose 
extensively in a search for clarity yet decide, for whatever reason, that detailing that analysis 
in full in the text of her opinion would be unnecessary or excessive. If one takes that 
possibility seriously, then perhaps it is unwise to focus too much on the reasoning a Justice 
offers (or fails to offer) to support her holding in a given case. Cf. Peter M. Tiersma, The 
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3. Chevron’s Cumulative Effect 
If Chevron is a rule of decision, one might expect to be able to discern 
empirically that it actually alters case outcomes. A number of studies have 
explored Chevron’s effect on agency affirmance rates, with mixed results.  
William Eskridge and Lauren Baer, analyzing 1,014 Supreme Court 
opinions evaluating agency statutory interpretations between 1983 and 2005, 
found that the Court affirmed agency interpretations 76.2% of the time under 
Chevron84—more often than either de novo review or the multifactor Skidmore 
standard, but less often than the Curtiss-Wright doctrine, which is sometimes 
described as a canon of construction.85 Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein 
analyzed a smaller set—sixty-nine Supreme Court opinions between 1989 and 
2005 in which the Court explicitly invoked Chevron—and found an affirmance 
rate of 67%.86 On the other hand, Miles and Sunstein also documented a high 
degree of variability among the individual Justices, ranging from high rates of 
deference under Chevron for Justice Breyer at 81.8% and Justice Souter at 77% 
down to Justice Scalia at 53.6% and Justice Thomas at 52.2%,87 which suggests 
that perhaps Chevron is not quite so rigid as its rule-like characterization might 
suggest. In two studies of studies predating 2010, David Zaring and Richard 
Pierce concluded separately that Chevron did not meaningfully change case 
outcomes.88 
Turning to the circuit courts, evaluating cases from 1995 and 1996, Orin 
Kerr found that agencies won 73% of Chevron cases in circuit courts.89 By 
comparison, with Matthew Krueger, one of us (Hickman) examined 106 cases 
 
Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1248–57 (2007) (describing the 
“textualization” of judicial opinion writing). 
 84 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1094, 1099, 1142 tbl.15 (2008); see also Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the 
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 
1007–09 (finding an affirmance rate of 76.7% under Chevron). 
 85 See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 84, at 1142; Abbe R. Gluck, Justice 
Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism’s Formalism 
Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2062 (2017) (suggesting that “most legislation 
scholars” see Curtiss-Wright as well as Chevron as canons of construction); Harold Hongju 
Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-
Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1309–10 (1988) (“Executive branch attorneys have read 
[Curtiss-Wright] as defining a canon of deferential statutory construction for courts 
construing foreign affairs statutes.”). 
 86 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825, 849 (2006). 
 87 Id. at 831. 
 88 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions 
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 135, 137, 171 (2010). 
 89 Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron 
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30 (1998). 
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applying Skidmore deference from 2001 through 2005 and found an affirmance 
rate of 60.4%.90 Christopher Walker and Kent Barnett’s more recent and 
comprehensive study found an affirmance rate of 77.4% when the circuit courts 
applied Chevron, compared to 38.5% when the circuit courts applied de novo 
review.91 But the de novo cases in Walker and Barnett’s dataset only included 
those cases in which a court had expressly mentioned Chevron and then decided 
to apply de novo review.92 In other words, Walker and Barnett did not account 
for cases in which a court resolved the interpretive question de novo—whether 
for or against the agency—without mentioning Chevron.93 One might expect 
that a court that mentioned and declined to apply Chevron might be predisposed 
to reject the agency’s interpretation. Still, these results led Walker and Barnett 
to conclude that “agency interpretations were significantly more likely to prevail 
under Chevron deference.”94  
While attempts to quantify Chevron’s impact provide useful food for 
thought, their utility in evaluating Chevron’s categorization may be limited. 
Even empirical studies finding a significant Chevron impact signal at most a 
correlative relationship between Chevron and case outcomes. The boundaries 
necessarily erected when creating data sets, defining variables, and placing 
cases into a limited number of coded categories make any definitive statement 
of causation elusive. In other words, the studies do not capture the nuances of 
why courts might affirm agencies more often under Chevron. Courts applying 
Chevron may believe that doctrine dictates a particular conclusion. But it is 
equally plausible that the conditions leading courts to apply Chevron in the first 
instance, such as the use of notice-and-comment rulemaking or the agency’s 
comparative expertise, yield superior agency interpretations that courts simply 
find more persuasive. No controlled study can meaningfully account for the 
wide range of factors that influence whether a court chooses to apply Chevron 
in a given case—not to mention the significant variation among courts and 
individual judges in what it means to apply Chevron.95 Whatever Chevron’s 
impact on affirmance rates, it is safe to say that whether or to what extent 
Chevron drives case outcomes is unsettled. 
 
 90 Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2007). 
 91 Barnett & Walker, supra note 24, at 30. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 6. But see Mark J. Richards, Joseph L. Smith, & Herbert M. Kritzer, Does 
Chevron Matter?, 28 L. & POL’Y 444, 464 (2006) (observing increased deference by the 
Supreme Court in the years following Chevron but also contending “that justices are 
influenced significantly, perhaps even primarily, by [the interaction of the justices’ attitudes 
with the policy direction of the agency decision]”). 
 95 Cf. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that 
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 
1905–07 (2009). 
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B. Standard of Review 
Chevron is frequently described as a standard of review.96 Courts and 
parties routinely recite the Chevron standard in the “standard of review” sections 
of judicial opinions97 and briefs98 when a litigant claims that an agency has 
misinterpreted a statute. Many proposals for eliminating Chevron purport to 
replace the doctrine with de novo review,99 which certainly is a standard of 
review.100  
In litigation, a standard of review is a “criterion by which the decision of a 
lower tribunal will be measured by a higher tribunal to determine its correctness 
or propriety.”101 In the Article III context, standards of review carry labels like 
de novo, clearly erroneous, abuse of discretion, and plain error.102 These labels 
represent “the degree of scrutiny with which federal appellate courts examine 
 
 96 See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 58 
(2011) (describing a situation in which “Chevron provided the appropriate standard of 
review”); NASDAQ Stock Mkt., LLC v. SEC, 961 F.3d 421, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 
(describing Chevron as part of determining what standard of review governs the statutory 
interpretation question at bar); Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. U.S. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206, 1244 
(10th Cir. 2020) (“When reviewing an agency’s legal determination, the court generally 
applies the standard of review articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron[.]”) (subsequent 
history omitted); Perez Perez v. Wolf, 943 F.3d 853, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2019) (instructing the 
district court to decide “the standard of review to apply on remand, including whether 
Chevron or Auer deference is appropriate”); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 
F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018) (identifying Chevron as a standard of review); Catskill 
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 508 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(holding that an agency rule “satisfies Chevron’s deferential standard of review”); see also 
HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOT, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW: REVIEW OF 
DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 136 (3d ed. 2018) (listing Chevron’s two 
steps among the standards of review for agency actions). 
 97 See, e.g., Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Hulu, LLC., 966 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2020); 
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, 955 F.3d 1038, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 
2020); Amezcua-Preciado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 943 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2019); Tilija 
v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 930 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2019); Matthews v. Barr, 927 F.3d 606, 612 
(2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-1022, 2020 WL 3492659 (2020). 
 98 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 27, Mass. Dep’t of Telecomms. & Cable v. FCC, 
No. 19-2282 (1st Cir. July 15, 2020), 2020 WL 4435348, at *27; Petitioner’s Opening Brief 
at 33–36, Bahr v. Wheeler, No. 20-70092 (9th Cir. May 29, 2020), 2020 WL 3002214, at 
*33–36; Response Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 16–18, Leiva v. Admin. Review Bd., 
No. 19-60524 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2019), 2019 WL 5784846, at *16–18; Brief for Respondent 
Federal Labor Relations Authority at 24, Antilles Consol. Educ. Ass’n v. FLRA, No. 19-
1111 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2019), 2019 WL 5683912, at *24. 
 99 See, e.g., Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. 
§ 2(3) (2016). 
 100 See EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 96, at 3. 
 101 Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 11, 15 (1994) (emphasis removed).   
 102 EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 96, at 3. 
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decisions emanating from district courts”103 or, in other words, “the degree to 
which circuit courts will defer to the decisions of district judges.”104  
Unlike rules of decision, standards of review do not dictate how courts 
should decide disputed questions of legal rights, obligations, or 
consequences.105 Instead, they are attitudinal, offering relative conceptions 
regarding just “how wrong” a lower tribunal must be to warrant reversal.106 To 
the extent that they call upon appellate judges to give way to the decisions of 
trial judges, however, these standards reflect “legislative and common-law 
allocations of decisional authority between” the two.107 In addition, standards 
of review “describe the relevant and appropriate materials the appellate court 
looks to in performing its review function”—e.g., whether the reviewer should 
consider the whole record.108  
In the administrative law context, courts review the decisions and actions of 
government agencies rather than those of lower courts. The Administrative 
Procedure Act109 and certain organic statutes110 add the arbitrary and capricious 
standard and the substantial evidence standard to the lexicon, for example.111 
Regardless, the basic concept is the same. These standards represent “the kind 
of scrutiny which a [c]ourt of [a]ppeals must give,”112 or “how closely the 
federal courts may scrutinize agency decisionmaking.”113  
1. Strength in Indeterminacy 
Standards of review are usually “easier to describe than to define.”114 
Ultimately, labels like “abuse of discretion,” “clearly erroneous,” “substantial 
evidence,” and “arbitrary and capricious” say little about how a court will 
 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 4–5; see also 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 1.01, at 1-2 to 1-4 (4th ed. 2010) (describing standards of review 
similarly in terms of scrutiny and deference). 
 105 See discussion supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text (describing rules of 
decision in these terms). 
 106 Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 235 (2009). 
 107 EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 96, at 3. 
 108 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 104, § 1.01, at 1-3. 
 109 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
 110 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (2012); 30 U.S.C. 
§ 816(a)(1) (2012); 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) (2012).  
 111 EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 96, at 136. Edwards and Elliot add the Chevron 
doctrine to the list of administrative law standards of review. Id. But as this Article 
demonstrates, that categorization is not universal. 
 112 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951). 
 113 EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 96, at 136. 
 114 Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. 
REV. 231, 232 (1991).  
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proceed to apply the standards those labels represent.115 Hence, standards of 
review often come with a deceptively uniform boilerplate of “talismanic” words 
that courts faithfully recite (and purport to apply), giving the false appearance 
of uniformity across cases.116 The boilerplate is an important first step of 
communicating the degree of scrutiny a reviewing court should apply, and it can 
help both the court and the litigants structure and frame their legal arguments, 
but it offers nothing remotely resembling bright lines to govern judicial 
decisionmaking.117  
The elusiveness of clear definitions or guidelines leads to considerable 
variation and inconsistency in how courts apply standards of review. On the 
other hand, that inconsistency, while the target of much criticism,118 may 
actually contribute to the strength of a standard of review.119  
Certainly this was the view of Justice Frankfurter in the Universal Camera 
case.120 That decision involved the parameters of the substantial evidence 
standard for judicial review of agency factual findings, rather than Chevron.121 
Regardless, courts frequently cite Justice Frankfurter’s description of the 
substantial evidence standard as requiring “more than a mere scintilla. It means 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion.”122 Justice Frankfurter recognized that the inherent indeterminacy 
of such language led to “inevitably variant applications” that “in due course bred 
criticism.”123 But far from eschewing that indeterminacy, Justice Frankfurter 
embraced it. He described standards of review as “mood[s]” that “can only serve 
as a standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid rules assuring sameness of 
 
 115 See, e.g., CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 104, § 1.01, at 1–2 (describing standards 
of review as “yardstick phrases” that “are not self-actualizing”).  
 116 See, e.g., Kunsch, supra note 101, at 12 (suggesting that courts invoke standards of 
review “talismanically” and “to create an illusion of harmony between the appropriate result 
and the applicable law”). 
 117 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 106, at 248–49 (explaining how ambiguity “gives a judge 
only a vague understanding of the boundaries each standard of review imposes”).  
 118 See, e.g., Todd J. Bruno, Say What?? Confusion in the Courts Over What Is the 
Proper Standard of Review for Hearsay Rulings, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 17 
(2013) (complaining that “standards of review are anything but self-defining and self-
applying” and that they “propagate[] judicial confusion”); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra 
Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2004) (suggesting that courts 
“employ[] standards of review as substitutes for analysis”). 
 119 See, e.g., Kunsch, supra note 101, at 13 (“The main point is that standards of review 
are and should be flexible.”). 
 120 See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
 121 See generally id. For further consideration, see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012). 
 122 Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 477 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 
197, 229 (1938)). The case is also known for its holding that a reviewing court applying the 
substantial evidence standard should consider the whole agency record rather than merely 
cherry-picking the evidence that supports the agency’s view. Id. at 487–88. 
 123 Id. at 477. 
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applications. Enforcement of such broad standards implies subtlety of mind and 
solidity of judgment.”124 Continuing the thought, he offered, 
A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for 
certitude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope for judicial 
discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual 
process of judging or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry. 
It cannot be too often repeated that judges are not automata. The ultimate 
reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence 
and character and the constant play of an informed professional critique upon 
its work. . . . There are no talismanic words that can avoid the process of 
judgment.125  
2. Chevron’s Flexibility 
At least at a superficial level, Chevron carries many of the trappings of a 
standard of review. Courts and commentators frequently refer to it as a standard 
of review.126 Courts and parties recite the Chevron standard in the “standard of 
review” sections of briefs and judicial opinions.127 Many proposals for 
eliminating Chevron involve replacing the doctrine with de novo review, which 
is certainly a standard of review.128  
Delving beneath that surface, like other standards of review, Chevron has a 
deceptively uniform boilerplate statement with two steps focused first on 
statutory clarity and second on reasonableness.129 In case after case, the 
Supreme Court has introduced its application of Chevron in such terms, whether 
 
 124 Id. at 487; see also Demer v. IBM Corp. Ltd. Plan, 835 F.3d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(Bybee, J., concurring) (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s mood characterization); 3 STEVEN 
ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 15.01, at 15-1 to 
15-2 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the same). 
 125 Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488–89. 
 126 See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 58 
(2011) (describing a situation in which “Chevron provided the appropriate standard of 
review”); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 508 
(2d Cir. 2017) (holding that an agency rule “satisfies Chevron’s deferential standard of 
review”); Global Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 407 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also EDWARDS 
& ELLIOTT, supra note 96, at 136 (listing Chevron’s two steps among the standards of review 
for agency actions); Nicholas R. Bednar, The Clear-Statement Chevron Canon, 66 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 819, 823 (2017); West, supra note 50, at 661. 
 127 See supra notes 97 & 98 (citing examples). 
 128 See, e.g., Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. 
§ 2(3) (2016). 
 129 See discussion supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and summarizing Chevron’s two steps). 
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it ultimately deferred to the agency130 or not.131 In City of Arlington v. FCC, the 
Court even described its recitation of Chevron’s two steps as “that case’s now-
canonical formulation.”132  
In other work, one of us has argued that the Chevron label and its two-step 
boilerplate represent a doctrine that is applied much more flexibly to 
accommodate a variety of interpretive methods and tools.133 Judges will of 
course disagree about what methods or tools are eligible for consideration at 
step one or when a statutory term is ambiguous. Some have treated Chevron’s 
first step as a threshold inquiry into whether the text of a statute entirely 
forecloses a proposed meaning.134 Others conduct a more robust step one 
inquiry that incorporates a comprehensive review of statutory text, purpose, 
legislative history, and substantive canons.135 In the face of arguably 
inconsistent Supreme Court precedent, the federal circuit courts are divided over 
whether legislative history may be considered at step one or must be postponed 
until step two.136 Many of these differences are attributable not to different 
visions of Chevron but to different interpretive methodologies. The variation 
persists into Chevron’s second step, where some judges have focused their 
reasonableness inquiry on the statutory text, history, and purpose137 while others 
have blended other factors into their analysis.138  
 
 130 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296, 307 (2013) (outlining and 
analyzing the case according to Chevron’s two steps before deferring to the agency’s 
interpretation); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665–66 
(2007) (same); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217–18, 222 (2002) (same); Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417–18 (1992) (same). 
 131 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124–25 (2016) 
(reciting Chevron’s two steps before declining to defer) (subsequent history omitted); FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132, 160 (2000) (same). 
 132 City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296. 
 133 Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1392, 1446 (2017).  
 134 See, e.g., Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002) (holding that a 
statute is ambiguous because it “does not foreclose” the agency’s interpretation).  
 135 See Scalia, supra note 9, at 521 (“One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning 
of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds 
less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists.”). 
 136 Compare, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. EPA, 793 F.3d 656, 665 (6th Cir. 2015) (listing 
legislative history among the “traditional tools” to be considered at Chevron’s first step), and 
BNSF Ry. Co. v. United States, 775 F.3d 743, 755 (5th Cir. 2015) (considering legislative 
history as part of step one analysis), with United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 292–94 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“[L]egislative history should not be considered at Chevron step one.”), and 
Coyomani-Cielo v. Holder, 758 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging that “some of 
our sister circuits consider legislative history at [Chevron step one], but we prefer to save 
that inquiry for Chevron’s second step”) (citation omitted). 
 137 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 386–92 (1999). 
 138 See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124–26 (2016) (declining 
Chevron deference for agency inconsistency) (subsequent history omitted); Michigan v. 
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–07 (2015) (blending Chevron and State Farm reasoned 
decisionmaking analysis). 
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Courts and scholars have advanced several competing versions of what 
Chevron requires.139 The decision tree model derived from multiple Supreme 
Court decisions and described above is one example.140 By comparison, Justice 
Breyer favors a much looser approach to Chevron that blends its assumptions 
about congressional delegations of interpretive power141 and statutory text, 
history, and purpose with a variety of other factors.142 Academic commentators 
have suggested that Chevron really only has one step,143 that the traditional two 
steps should be reversed,144 or that State Farm’s reasoned decisionmaking 
analysis should be incorporated into Chevron step two.145  
All of these variations of Chevron share a basic premise: that strong, though 
not unquestioning, judicial deference is warranted for some subset of agency 
statutory interpretations because of a legislative decision to confer some amount 
of policymaking discretion on the agency tasked with implementing statutory 
requirements.146 All of Chevron’s variations acknowledge the doctrine’s two 
 
 139 Bednar & Hickman, supra note 133, at 1418–42 (summarizing several competing 
interpretations of Chevron advanced by legal scholars and in Supreme Court opinions). 
 140 See discussion supra notes 61–83 and accompanying text. 
 141 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) 
(explaining Chevron deference by reference to express and implicit delegations from 
Congress of authority to elucidate statutory meaning); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218, 226–29 (2001) (premising Chevron deference on congressional delegations of 
interpretive authority).  
 142 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 308–11 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part) (discussing and relying on different factors); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 
U.S. 212, 221–22 (2002) (emphasizing the interpretation’s longevity and listing other 
potentially relevant factors); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 596–97 (2000) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Chevron only added an additional factor of 
congressional delegation to the traditional, multi-factor Skidmore analysis); see also 
Hickman, supra note 44, at 541–42 (describing Justice Breyer’s approach as like a “word 
cloud”). 
 143 See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 599. 
 144 Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 619 (2014). 
 145 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 10, at 1266–79; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: 
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 83, 129–30 (1994). 
 146 The most common term for this premise is delegation. See, e.g., Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. at 226–27 (holding that eligibility for Chevron deference turns on a congressional 
delegation of authority to act with the force of law). Justice Scalia objected to the delegation 
terminology. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
1005, 1014–20 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 239, 241–45 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). But Justice Scalia also acknowledged that “[a]n ambiguity in a statute 
committed to agency implementation” sometimes means that “Congress . . . meant to leave 
its resolution to the agency,” which many would find indistinguishable from delegation. 
Scalia, supra note 9, at 516; see also Bednar & Hickman, supra note 133, at 1443 
(elaborating this idea). Current debates over the constitutionality of such delegations are 
beside the point. See generally, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). If a 
delegation is unconstitutional, then Chevron deference obviously would be unavailable to 
interpretations adopted pursuant to that delegation. Cf. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 133, 
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steps as its boilerplate description, even if from there they argue for more or 
fewer steps in actual application.147 And all of Chevron’s variations accept its 
call for judges to engage in some application of traditional tools of statutory 
construction to evaluate statutory meaning.148  
Beyond that, however, the many variations of Chevron diverge in 
innumerable different directions. Yet none of the variations are demonstrably 
incorrect, all are theoretically defensible, and all find support in opinions of the 
Supreme Court.149 Chevron is capacious enough to accommodate them all.  
C. Canon of Construction 
A growing body of scholarship classifies Chevron itself as a “canon of 
construction.”150 The phrase generally refers to a broad collection of linguistic 
and substantive principles that judges might apply to resolve statutory 
interpretation questions.151 Canons fall into subcategories that reflect the 
differences in their origins and purposes. Semantic canons reflect widely held 
understandings about grammar and usage and are based on the premise that 
those common principles inform how one reads statutory text.152 Substantive 
canons also help judges resolve statutory ambiguities, but reflect policy goals 
and value judgments rather than shared understandings about language.153 Some 
 
at 1453–56 (arguing that Chevron deference, or something like it, is inevitable so long as the 
Court accepts congressional delegation of policymaking discretion).  
 147 See, e.g., Bednar & Hickman, supra note 133, at 1418–42. 
 148 See id. 
 149 See id. 
 150 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO 
READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 417–18 (2016) (describing Chevron as an “extrinsic 
source canon”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: 
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 618–19 (1992) 
(describing Chevron as a substantive canon); Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 2118 (listing 
Chevron alongside constitutional avoidance and reliance on legislative history as methods 
of resolving statutory ambiguity); Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1765–66 
(concluding that the Supreme Court treats Chevron more like a canon than as binding 
precedent); see also generally Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative 
Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125 (2019) (comparing Chevron 
to other “interpretive methodologies”). 
 151 Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 42, at 65–67. 
 152 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 924–25 (2013) (describing semantic canons); Christopher J. Walker, 
Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1022–23 (2015) (same); cf. 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 51 (2012) (“Most of the canons of interpretation . . . are not ‘rules’ of interpretation 
in any strict sense but presumptions about what an intelligently produced text conveys.”). 
 153 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar & Victoria F. Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L. 
REV. 163, 179–81 (2018) (contrasting “language” (semantic) canons and substantive ones); 
Walker, supra note 152, at 1031 (describing substantive canons); see also, e.g., Gluck & 
Bressman, supra note 152, at 924 (same). 
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scholars recognize a third category of “extrinsic canons” that concern when 
judges might consult “outside sources”—extratextual material including but not 
limited to legislative history.154  
Canons typically consist of a trigger and response. For example, under the 
well known ejusdem generis canon, the trigger typically is a list of covered items 
accompanied by an ambiguous catchall term, and the response is to interpret that 
catchall term to include only those things that are “like” the other items in the 
list.155 For the rule of lenity, arguably much like Chevron, the trigger is 
ambiguity in a criminal statute, and the response is to interpret that ambiguity 
in the defendant’s favor.156  
Some substantive canons are clear statement rules, requiring Congress to 
signal its intentions clearly before the courts will apply the canon.157 But a 
number of substantive canons are ambiguity tie breakers.158 And when the 
application of a substantive canon turns on an amorphous finding like 
“ambiguity,” the trigger may be somewhat difficult to establish.159 Regardless, 
once a court has identified the trigger, a canon’s utility lies in its ease of 
application.  
A single canon rarely provides the sole basis for a judicial decision, and 
canons usually appear in combination with one another in justifying an 
 
 154 See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, supra note 152, at 924–25; Noah B. Lindell, The 
Dignity Canon, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 431 (2017); Philip A. Talmadge, A New 
Approach to Statutory Interpretation in Washington, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 179, 196–99 
(2001). 
 155 See, e.g., Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of 
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384–85 (2003); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936); 
cf. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543–46 (2015) (discussing and applying the ejusdem 
generis canon along with the “similar” noscitur a sociis canon); Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 720–21 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I 
would call it noscitur a sociis, but the principle is much the same: The fact that several items 
in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that 
attribute as well”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 
U.S. 578, 587–89 (1980) (describing limitations of the ejusdem generis canon and declining 
to apply it). 
 156 See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107–08 (1990). 
 157 See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 150, at 611–
12; John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 121–
26 (2001). 
 158 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 109, 117–19 (2010) (describing types of canons); Brian G. Slocum, Overlooked 
Temporal Issues in Statutory Interpretation, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 635, 665 (2008) (discussing 
canons as ambiguity tie breakers). 
 159 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (“The simple existence of 
some statutory ambiguity, however, is not sufficient to warrant application of [the rule of 
lenity], for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.”); Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 2118 
(“[J]udges often cannot make [the] initial clarity versus ambiguity decision in a settled, 
principled, or evenhanded way.”); see also Slocum, supra note 158, at 665 (describing tie-
breaker canons as “[t]he weakest substantive canons”). 
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interpretive result.160 Especially when a substantive canon serves as an 
ambiguity tie breaker, courts usually exhaust other interpretive tools before 
turning to the canon.161 Consequently, judges rarely consider themselves bound 
to apply a particular canon, particularly when they can resolve the interpretive 
question in some other way.162  
1. Chevron as a Substantive Canon 
Categorizing Chevron as a substantive canon of construction has a certain 
intuitive appeal. Chevron is predicated on certain understandings and 
assumptions regarding interbranch relationships and congressional intent as 
conveyed through express and implied delegations to agencies of the authority 
to act with the force and effect of law.163 Courts often employ it in conjunction 
with other canons;164 indeed, the Chevron decision itself instructed courts to do 
so.165 The Supreme Court thus has expressly styled Chevron with many of the 
trappings of a substantive canon—instructing reviewing courts to apply other 
interpretive tools to discern statutory meaning and congressional intent first, and 
then in the face of ambiguity, telling them which side should win. Framing 
Chevron as a substantive canon maintains much of the doctrine’s substance and 
merely replaces the rhetoric of deference with that of ambiguity tie breakers, 
clear statement rules, and presumptions. 
To that end, legal scholars have offered competing articulations of Chevron 
as a substantive canon. Cass Sunstein summarized it in one sentence: “[i]n the 
face of ambiguity, statutes mean what the relevant agency takes them to 
mean.”166 He described Chevron as “the quintessential prodelegation canon,” 
 
 160 See Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1734–35. 
 161 See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138 (“The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing 
everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no more than a guess as to what 
Congress intended.”) (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)) (internal 
quotation marks and ellipses omitted); Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108 (“Instead, we have always 
reserved lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s 
intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and 
motivating policies of the statute.”) (internal quotations omitted).   
 162 See Gluck & Posner, supra note 18, at 1334 (reporting that most judges did not feel 
bound to use particular canons). 
 163 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (expressly 
basing Chevron deference on the agency’s delegated authority to act with the force of law); 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44, 865–66 (1984).  
 164 See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 594–600 (2004); 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 694, 697, 707–
08 (1995); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 610–14 (1991); Humane Soc’y of U.S. 
v. Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 165 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
 166 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 329 (2000); see 
also Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 150, at 618–19 (providing a substantially similar 
framing of the Chevron canon: “Unless refuted by the clear language of the statute, a court 
must defer to [an] agency interpretation”). 
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noting that Chevron incorporates a presumption that ambiguity is a delegation 
of interpretive power to agencies rather than to courts.167 Nicholas Bednar, 
expanding on earlier work by William Eskridge and Philip Frickey,168 has 
framed the Chevron canon more forcefully as a clear statement rule: “[u]nless 
refuted by the clear language of the statute, a court must defer to an agency 
interpretation.”169 Like other substantive canons, Chevron creates a 
presumption of congressional intent that arises in the face of textual silence or 
ambiguity.170 The constitutional avoidance canon, for example, does something 
similar in the case of an ambiguity that raises a serious constitutional 
question.171  
Substantive canons implement values.172 Viewing Chevron as a substantive 
canon, one can reframe the doctrine’s traditional justifications as the values that 
the Chevron canon promotes. The Court itself has justified Chevron in terms of 
superior agency subject matter expertise and democratic legitimacy, in addition 
to its presumption that Congress signals a preference for agencies to resolve 
statutory gaps when it delegates policymaking authority to agencies.173 Cass 
Sunstein has suggested also that Chevron is a statement about the allocation of 
government power, “defin[ing] a cluster of ideas about who is entrusted with 
interpreting ambiguous statutes.”174 As a canon of statutory construction, 
Chevron transforms these animating principles into just another tool for 
resolving statutory meaning. 
2. The Chevron Canon in Practice 
In practice, some Justices have approached Chevron deference to agency 
interpretations of statutes as they would any other canon—i.e., as one of several 
factors or elements supporting an interpretive result. Consistent with the notion 
 
 167 Sunstein, supra note 166, at 329. 
 168 Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 150, at 618–19. 
 169 Bednar, supra note 126, at 822. 
 170 West, supra note 50, at 658. 
 171 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (stating that, where multiple 
plausible interpretations exist, the avoidance canon rests “on the reasonable presumption that 
Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts”). 
 172 See Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 150, at 595 (describing substantive canons 
as “clear statement rules or presumptions of statutory interpretation that reflect substantive 
values drawn from the common law, federal statutes, or the United States Constitution”). 
 173 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629–30 (2018) (emphasizing 
democratic accountability as well as delegation as justifications for Chevron); Negusie v. 
Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 531 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Certain aspects of statutory 
interpretation . . . are properly understood as delegated by Congress to an expert and 
accountable administrative body.”); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (noting 
that agency expertise counsels in favor of deference); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 229 (2001) (describing Chevron as premised on a congressional delegation theory); 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (justifying 
Chevron on all three grounds). 
 174 Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, supra note 73, at 2075. 
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that courts are not bound to preference one canon over another, the Court often 
has applied Chevron “episodically and not entirely predictably.”175 Empirical 
analysis by William Eskridge and Lauren Baer documented the Court’s failure 
to mention Chevron at all in a little more than half of the cases between 1984 
and 2006 in which it might have done so.176  
Subsequent research by Connor Raso and William Eskridge separately 
identified several trends in Chevron’s application that they associated with 
canons of construction.177 One was the Justices’ application of Chevron 
“episodically and not entirely predictably,” which prompts them to characterize 
Chevron as a “flexible rule[] of thumb or presumption[]” that a Justice may or 
may not apply.178 Second, they note that individual Justices apply Chevron in 
idiosyncratic ways based on “each Justice’s particular normative vision”179—
notably a characteristic we also associate with Chevron as a standard of 
review.180 According to Raso and Eskridge, however, the Court’s frequent 
failure to mention Chevron where it applies demonstrates that the Court does 
not apply Chevron even when it appears applicable.181  
To support their characterization, Raso and Eskridge offer the useful 
example of Smith v. City of Jackson.182 In that case, the Justices divided over 
how to approach an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
interpretation that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
permitted recovery for disparate impact claims.183 In an opinion for a plurality 
of the Court, Justice Stevens analyzed the text and history of the ADEA to 
conclude that disparate impact claims were permitted, but failed to mention 
Chevron.184 The EEOC’s consistent interpretation provided further support for 
the Court’s conclusion but appeared to have little to no bearing on the Court’s 
analysis.185 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in SAS Institute v. Iancu is a more recent 
example.186 Citing Chevron’s two-step framework up front, Justice Breyer then 
examined the statutory text, structure, and purposes—as well as the practical 
implications of the majority’s holding—to conclude that the inter partes review 
 
 175 Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1734, 1766. 
 176 See Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 84, at 1089–90 (“[F]rom the time it was handed 
down until the end of the 2005 term, Chevron was applied in only 8.3% of Supreme Court 
cases evaluating agency statutory interpretations [and] in the majority of [those] cases–
53.6% of them–the Court does not apply any deference regime at all.”). 
 177 See generally Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62. 
 178 Id. at 1766. 
 179 Id.  
 180 See discussion supra notes 114–25 and accompanying text. 
 181 Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1740 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial 
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 982–84 (1992)).  
 182 Id. at 1729 (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005)). 
 183 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005). 
 184 See generally id. 
 185 Id. at 239–40. 
 186 See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1360 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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statute was ambiguous as to whether the Patent Office could limit its review to 
only certain challenged patent claims.187 Justice Breyer then returned to 
Chevron:  
In referring to Chevron, I do not mean that courts are to treat that case like 
a rigid, black-letter rule of law, instructing them always to allow agencies 
leeway to fill every gap in every statutory provision. Rather, I understand 
Chevron as a rule of thumb, guiding courts in an effort to respect that leeway 
which Congress intended the agencies to have. I recognize that Congress does 
not always consider such matters, but if not, courts can often implement a more 
general, virtually omnipresent congressional purpose—namely, the creation of 
a well-functioning statutory scheme—by using a canon-like, judicially created 
construct, the hypothetical reasonable legislator, and asking what such 
legislators would likely have intended had Congress considered the question 
of delegating gap-filling authority to the agency.188 
Applying this understanding, Justice Breyer concluded that the statute’s 
complexity and “the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative 
experience” counseled in favor of deference.189 
Separately, in documenting Chevron’s effect on Congress, Abbe Gluck and 
Lisa Schultz Bressman also have concluded that Chevron operates as a canon, 
which they label as “deliberation-forcing.”190 According to Gluck and 
Bressman, while Chevron does not necessarily reflect linguistic norms under 
which both courts and Congress may operate, as is the case with some other 
canons, Chevron nevertheless reminds statute drafters of the “consequences of 
ambiguity.”191 Similarly, Chevron may create expectations in drafters of both 
statutes and regulations for how a court will resolve interpretive questions in the 
face of ambiguity and delegation of policymaking power.192 The more those 
expectations are tested and confirmed through the iterative process of drafting 
and judicial review, the more they will become reliable predictors of statutory 
and regulatory meaning. 
III.  WHY DO WE CARE? 
Most cases in which courts contemplate Chevron can be resolved without 
digging too deeply into the doctrine’s nuances. In many cases, the reviewing 
 
 187 Id. at 1360–64. 
 188 Id. at 1364 (citation omitted). 
 189 Id. at 1364–65 (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002)). 
 190 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 152, at 996. 
 191 Id.  
 192 See id.; Walker, supra note 152, at 1007 (reporting that agency regulation drafters 
are “well aware of the Chevron deference standard”); cf. United States v. Home Concrete & 
Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 503 (2012) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Our legal system 
presumes there will be continuing dialogue among the three branches of Government on 
questions of statutory interpretation and application.”). 
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court decides that Chevron obviously does not apply because the agency action 
in question obviously lacks the force of law so is ineligible for Chevron 
deference on that basis.193 In other cases, the Court simply decides the meaning 
of the statute is clear, signaling that the outcome would be the same with or 
without Chevron, and thereby avoiding any question of deference.194 With some 
regularity, courts volunteer that they would resolve the case one way or the other 
irrespective of deference doctrine and without deciding whether Chevron or any 
other such doctrine might otherwise apply.195 In all such cases, how one 
categorizes Chevron is probably irrelevant. 
Sometimes, however, disagreements over how to think about the Chevron 
doctrine cannot be avoided. In such cases, courts need more of a theoretical 
framework for thinking about Chevron’s nuances. In recent years, two such 
issues have become particularly salient. One is an emerging disagreement 
among the circuit courts over whether or under what circumstances the 
government can waive or forfeit its eligibility for Chevron deference. The other 
is the substantially more fundamental question whether the Supreme Court 
should overrule Chevron altogether as incompatible with and an abdication of 
the judiciary’s constitutional role.  
A. Waiving Chevron 
In our adversarial judicial system, failing to make certain arguments—to 
assert rights or privileges—on a timely basis may prevent a litigant from 
obtaining judicial review of those arguments at all.196 Not every argument can 
 
 193 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487–88 (2004); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 234 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
 194 See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113–14 (2018); Esquivel-Quintana 
v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 
2040 (2012); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002). 
 195 See Freeman, 132 S. Ct. at 2040; Indian River Cty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 945 
F.3d 515, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-1304, 2020 WL 5882262 (2020); 
Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214, 220 (2d Cir. 2014); Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. 
& Env’t Control v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 685 F.3d 259, 284 n.25 (3d Cir. 2012); see 
also Frederick Liu, Chevron as a Doctrine of Hard Cases, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 285, 335 n.302 
(2014) (“Put differently, when the statute’s meaning is clear, the choice among Chevron, 
Skidmore, or some other standard is moot—which probably explains why, in the majority of 
cases the Court hears in which an agency construction is available, the Court declines to 
invoke any deference regime whatsoever.”). 
 196 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (“No procedural principle 
is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as 
well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having 
jurisdiction to determine it.”); see also, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482 (2011) 
(making the same point and rejecting an argument as forfeited); Freytag v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 894–95 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (discussing forfeiture and reasons for it); CATHERINE T. STRUVE, 16AA 
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be waived or forfeited in this manner. For that matter, waiver and forfeiture are 
similar but not precisely the same. Waiver involves the “intentional 
relinquishment” of a right or privilege,197 while forfeiture involves the failure—
whether intentional or not—to pursue a right or privilege by raising it in court.198 
While courts may revive forfeited claims in the interest of justice,199 a claim 
that is waived generally is waived for good.200 Conversely, “[a] right that cannot 
be waived [also] cannot be forfeited.”201 
A strand of cases and commentary has emerged in recent years suggesting 
that an agency may waive or forfeit the eligibility of a particular agency 
statutory interpretation for Chevron deference. Sometimes the issue arises 
because the government has either disclaimed or failed to advocate adequately 
for Chevron deference in briefs before a reviewing court.202 In other instances, 
the issue stems from the government’s decision not to defend the agency 
statutory interpretation under challenge.203 Cases addressing the issue thus 
concern both waiver and forfeiture. As Justice Scalia once observed, the 
Supreme Court has often used the terms interchangeably,204 and commentators 
generally seem to have chosen the waiver label as a shorthand for both in the 
Chevron context,205 so we will do the same. 
Regardless, how courts categorize Chevron is highly relevant for thinking 
about waiver questions. As we discuss below, the notion that the government 
 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURIS. § 3974.1(5) (4th ed. 2020) (describing the law of 
waiver and forfeiture). 
 197 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
 198 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); see also, e.g., Hamer v. 
Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 & 17 n.1 (2017) (describing the 
difference between waiver and forfeiture in the context of a civil case); Kontrick v. Ryan, 
540 U.S. 443, 458 & 458 n.13 (2004) (same). 
 199 Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 471 n.5 (2012) (citing Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 
198 (2006)) (“[A] federal court has the authority to resurrect only forfeited defenses.”). 
 200 United States v. Jimenez, 512 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (“A waiver is unlike a 
forfeiture, for the consequence of a waiver is that the objection in question is 
unreviewable.”); Note, Waiving Chevron Deference, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1523–24 
(2019) (making this observation).  
 201 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 894–95 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 202 See, e.g., Hays Med. Ctr. v. Azar, 956 F.3d 1247, 1264 & 1264 n.18 (10th Cir. 2020); 
Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 21–22 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789, 789 (2020) (mem.); Neustar, Inc. v. 
FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 893–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017); cf. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
899 F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018) (observing that the parties in the case “seem[ed] to assume, 
without any analysis, that [the agency’s] interpretation of the relevant statutes is eligible for 
Chevron review” before deciding that Chevron is not waivable). 
 203 See, e.g., Glob. Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 407–08 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 204 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 894–95 n.2 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring on the 
judgment).  
 205 See, e.g., James Durling & E. Garrett West, Essay, May Chevron Be Waived?, 71 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 183, 183 (2019) (describing the issue in terms of waiver); Rozansky, 
supra note 27, at 1928 (same). 
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can waive or forfeit its claim to Chevron deference is plausible if Chevron is a 
rule of decision, but much less so if Chevron is a standard of review or a canon 
of construction. 
1. Emergence of the Chevron Waiver Argument 
Courts have long been criticized for failing to mention Chevron at all in 
cases where it would obviously seem to apply.206 In their study of Supreme 
Court statutory interpretation cases, William Eskridge, Jr. and Lauren Baer 
documented that more than half of the cases decided between the Chevron 
decision and the end of the Court’s 2005 term cited no deference doctrine at all 
and instead saw the Court resolving the case based on its own ad hoc 
reasoning.207 Thomas Merrill, writing on his time in the Office of the Solicitor 
General in the early 1990s, described that office’s strategic decision to push 
Chevron arguments in lower courts, where it felt they would be favorably 
received, but not in the Supreme Court, where it felt there was a greater risk of 
an anti-government ruling.208 Such cases are notable, however, more for their 
silence regarding Chevron’s applicability, rather than any express claims or 
pronouncements regarding the government’s waiver of Chevron deference.  
As a more overt legal position, the concept of Chevron waiver seems to have 
originated in the D.C. Circuit’s 2015 decision in Lubow v. Department of 
State.209 The challengers and the government agreed in Lubow that the court 
should evaluate regulation at issue using the Chevron framework, so the court 
stated that it did not need to consider “potential arguments [the challengers] 
might have made (but did not make) against” Chevron deference.210 In making 
this statement, the Lubow court did not explain what argument it thought might 
have been made.211 Instead, it cited Peter Pan Bus Lines v. Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration,212 in which the D.C. Circuit found a statutory 
provision ambiguous but declined to evaluate the reasonableness of an agency’s 
interpretation because the agency had indicated in the regulatory preamble that 
it believed the statute to be unambiguous.213 Without further analysis, the court 
in Lubow went on to say that “[t]he applicability of the Chevron framework does 
not go to [the] court’s jurisdiction, and a party therefore can forfeit an argument 
 
 206 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 3.6.10, at 337 (6th ed. 2019); Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 84, at 1108. 
 207 See Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 84, at 1100. 
 208 See Thomas W. Merrill, Confessions of a Chevron Apostate, 19 ADMIN. & REG. L. 
NEWS, Winter 1994, at 1, 14.  
 209 See generally Lubow v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 783 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 210 Id. at 884. 
211 See generally id. 
 212 Id. at 884 (citing Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 
F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 213 Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350, 1353–
54 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
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against deference by failing to raise it,” but the forfeiture issue in the case cited 
for that proposition concerned the Appointments Clause, not Chevron.214  
Irrespective of whether the Lubow court intended its words to create a new 
legal argument, the D.C. Circuit appeared to extend its endorsement of Chevron 
waiver in Neustar, Inc. v. FCC.215 The case concerned a Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) informal adjudication,216 which arguably 
may not have been eligible for Chevron deference in any event in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Mead Corp.217 On this occasion, 
however, the court held that the FCC had simply forfeited eligibility for Chevron 
deference by failing to argue for it expressly.218 Although the FCC had asserted 
that “[r]eview of the FCC’s interpretation of the statutes it administers is 
governed by Chevron” and recited Chevron’s two steps in its brief’s separate 
“Standard of Review” section,219 the court cited Lubow and held that these 
“nominal[] references” were insufficient to invoke Chevron and that the agency 
had “forfeited any claims to Chevron deference.”220 
A subsequent D.C. Circuit panel walked back the Neustar holding a bit.221 
In SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board, the government defended 
a Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) interpretation of the Copyright Act adopted 
through formal rulemaking.222 On this occasion, the government neither cited 
Chevron in its brief nor framed its arguments around Chevron’s two steps. But 
the government also did not assert de novo review. Instead, the government 
contended that the court should defer to the CRB unless its interpretation was 
“arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or not supported by substantial 
evidence.”223 The court, by contrast, observed that it had “previously applied 
the Chevron framework when reviewing the [CRB’s] interpretation of the same 
statutory provision.”224 It acknowledged that its decision in Neustar “held that 
an agency can forfeit its ability to obtain deferential review under Chevron by 
failing to invoke Chevron in its briefing,” but maintained that the Neustar 
 
 214 Lubow, 783 F.3d at 884 (emphasis added) (citing Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). 
 215 Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
216 Id. at 888–89. 
 217 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226−27 (2001) (requiring agency 
action to carry the force of law to obtain Chevron deference); id. at 239 n.1 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (finding unclear whether the Court’s approach would apply to informal as well 
as formal adjudications). 
 218 Neustar, 857 F.3d at 893–94. 
 219 Brief for Respondents at 26–27, Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886 (D. C. Cir. 2017) 
(No. 15-1080), 2015 WL 9250677, at *26–27. 
 220 Neustar, 857 F.3d at 894. 
 221 SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 904 F.3d 41, 54–55 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 222 Id. at 45–46. 
 223 See Final Brief for Appellees at 18, SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 
904 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 16-1159) (quoting Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 
 224 SoundExchange, 904 F.3d at 53–54. 
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opinion “did not indicate a ‘magic words’ requirement.”225 The court then 
distinguished Neustar on the ground that the underlying FCC orders in that case 
also “show[ed] no invocation of Chevron deference for this matter,” and 
additionally recognized that the FCC’s action in Neustar, as an informal 
adjudication, might not have been eligible for Chevron deference in the first 
place.226 The court then concluded that Chevron deference was appropriate 
because the CRB’s rulemaking was “the kind of interpretive exercise to which 
review under Chevron generally applies” and the agency, in acting, had both 
considered the statute’s text, history, purpose, and surrounding case law and 
asserted the reasonableness of its interpretation.227  
Finally, the D.C. Circuit expressly rejected the government’s ability to 
waive Chevron review in Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & 
Explosives, upholding a regulation banning bump stocks.228 In Guedes, the 
agency invoked Chevron by name in its regulatory preamble.229 Before the D.C. 
Circuit, however, the government maintained that de novo review was 
appropriate and that “Chevron plays no role in this case” with little 
explanation.230 That litigating position did not convince the court. Here again, 
the court noted that the agency had advanced its interpretation in a legislative 
rule using notice-and-comment rulemaking, which ordinarily would mean 
eligibility for Chevron deference under Mead.231 Although the court cited the 
agency’s express invocation of Chevron in its regulatory preamble as further 
evidence of the regulation’s legislative character, the court’s analysis makes 
clear that satisfaction of Mead’s force of law requirement alone was enough for 
the interpretation in question to be eligible for Chevron deference.232  
To make its position even more clear, the D.C. Circuit in Guedes then 
proceeded to reject outright the possibility that an agency can either waive or 
forfeit Chevron deference for one of its actions.233 The court also noted several 
practical and doctrinal tensions that made Chevron an “awkward conceptual fit 
for the doctrines of forfeiture and waiver.”234 Chevron, is a “doctrine about 
 
 225 Id. at 54. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 54–55 (citing 81 Fed. Reg. 26,316, 26,332 (May 2, 2016)). 
 228 Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. 
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 231 Guedes, 920 F.3d at 6, 20. 
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issue of Chevron waiver. See id. at 41 n.10 (Henderson, J., dissenting). 
 234 Id. at 22. 
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statutory meaning,” according to the court, “not a ‘right’ or ‘privilege’ 
belonging to a litigant.”235  
Although the D.C. Circuit, after contemplation, seems to have moved away 
from its early embrace of Chevron waiver, other circuits have addressed or at 
least acknowledged the issue.236 In Sierra Club v. U.S. Department of the 
Interior, the Fourth Circuit rejected outright Chevron’s waivability, labeling the 
doctrine a standard of review that cannot be waived and must be assessed 
independently by the court.237 The Second Circuit in New York v. Department 
of Justice seems to have reached the opposite conclusion, noting disagreement 
between other circuits and interpreting the statute de novo because the 
government did not claim Chevron deference.238 
The Tenth Circuit appears divided, at least for now, over the question of 
Chevron’s waivability. In Hays Medical Center v. Azar, that court considered 
whether Medicare reimbursement regulations adopted by the Department of 
Health and Human Services were arbitrary and capricious under the State Farm 
doctrine.239 In its brief, the government attempted to recast its argument by 
citing Chevron rather than State Farm.240 The court rejected this reframing in a 
long footnote in which it contended that the government’s “perfunctory and 
fleeting invocation of Chevron waives [its] argument for Chevron 
deference.”241 A few weeks later, in Aposhian v. Barr, a different Tenth Circuit 
panel considered an interlocutory appeal regarding the same bump-stock 
regulations at stake in the Guedes case discussed above.242 Again, the 
government disavowed reliance on Chevron, and Aposhian argued that the 
government consequently had waived Chevron deference.243 A divided panel 
disagreed, observing that Aposhian had framed his own arguments in terms of 
Chevron’s two steps and, thus, had invited the Court to do the same.244 A 
dissenting judge disagreed, contending that the court should respect the 
government’s disavowal of Chevron deference.245 The Tenth Circuit has 
granted en banc review in Aposhian to consider, among other questions, whether 
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 244 Aposhian, 958 F.3d at 980–82.  
 245 Id. at 998 (Carson, J., dissenting). 
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“Chevron step-two deference depend[s] on one or both parties invoking it, i.e., 
can it be waived?”246 
Finally, the Supreme Court has offered its own signals that it might be 
receptive to the Chevron waiver argument. Justice Gorsuch in particular seems 
to favor the idea that Chevron can be waived. Writing in dissent in BNSF 
Railway Co. v. Loos, Justice Gorsuch expressly noted that the party claiming the 
validity and support of the administering agency’s interpretation of the relevant 
statute “devoted scarcely any of its briefing to Chevron” and, at oral argument, 
“didn’t even mention the case until the final seconds.”247 Justice Gorsuch had 
other problems with the agency’s interpretation in that case, calling it “an 
inferior interpretation of the law that may be more the product of politics than a 
scrupulous reading of the statute.”248  
Subsequently, however, in a statement accompanying the Supreme Court’s 
denial of certiorari in the Guedes case, Justice Gorsuch expressly rejected the 
D.C. Circuit’s application of Chevron.249 He contended that Chevron “has 
nothing to say about the proper interpretation of the law before us” because “the 
government expressly waived reliance on Chevron.”250 He cited Eskridge & 
Baer among other sources in claiming that the Court “has often declined to apply 
Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it.”251  
Whether the rest of the Court favors the Chevron waiver argument is less 
clear. In County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, Justice Breyer for the Court 
observed that the Solicitor General had not asked for Chevron deference for an 
Environmental Protection Agency “Interpretive Statement.”252 The EPA’s 
interpretive statement was the sort of informal, subregulatory guidance that the 
Supreme Court in Mead suggested was not eligible for Chevron deference in the 
first place.253 And Justice Breyer went on to acknowledge that the Court found 
the agency’s interpretation “neither persuasive nor reasonable” in any event.254 
Further, as previously noted, Justice Breyer has always held a somewhat 
idiosyncratic and mushy view of Chevron and Skidmore as a single, blended, 
multifactor standard.255 Nevertheless, his mere observation that the government 
had failed to argue for Chevron deference prompted Aaron Nielson to wonder 
 
 246 Order at 1, Aposhian v. Barr, 958 F.3d 969, 974 (10th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-4036), 2020 
WL 5268055, *1.  
 247 BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893, 908–09 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 248 Id. 
 249 Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 789–
90 (2020) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., statement). 
 250 Id. at 789. 
 251 Id. at 790 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1084, 1121–24 (2008)). 
 252 Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020). 
253 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 234 (2001). 
 254 Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. at 1474. 
 255 See supra note 141–42 and accompanying text. 
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whether the Court was holding “that Skidmore, rather than Chevron, applied 
when agency counsel doesn’t argue for deference.”256 
2. Implications of Categorization for Chevron Waiver 
Many judicial opinions merely hint at the possibility of Chevron waiver, for 
example in refusing to consider a belated argument that a relevant regulation 
itself is unreasonable or invalid,257 or by suggesting that similarly-situated 
parties might argue that particular types of agency pronouncements are 
ineligible for Chevron review.258 Most of the opinions that more clearly support 
Chevron’s waivability offer little analysis as to why their authors believe that 
Chevron is waivable. They merely note that the government disavowed 
Chevron’s applicability or failed to claim Chevron deference adequately or at 
all.259  
In a few instances, however, circuit courts have engaged the question of 
Chevron’s categorization as part of considering whether Chevron is waivable. 
For example, one of the most fascinating aspects of the D.C. Circuit’s initial 
embrace and subsequent rejection of the argument, described above, is the way 
in which that court’s discussions of the issue reflect the different potential 
categorizations of Chevron as a doctrine. That court in Lubow based its waiver 
conclusion in part on its characterization of Chevron as nonjurisdictional.260 By 
contrast, that same court in Guedes decided that Chevron could not be waived 
at least partly because it saw Chevron as resembling interpretive canons like 
expressio unius and constitutional avoidance.261  
Other circuits clearly appreciate the significance of Chevron’s 
categorization for the question of waiver. Summarizing the disagreement, but 
without reaching its own conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit in Martin v. Social 
Security Administration contended that some courts treat Chevron as “a non-
jurisdictional argument that parties may waive,” while others “analogiz[e] 
Chevron deference to a standard of review that the court must independently 
 
 256 Aaron L. Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review – Reviewed: More Chevron Waiver, YALE J. 
ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/d-c-circuit-
review-reviewed-more-chevron-waiver/ [https://perma.cc/B3PW-J7FN]. 
 257 See, e.g., Dutcher v. Matheson, 840 F.3d 1183, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 2016) (alternately 
describing a “late-blooming argument” that an applicable regulation was invalid as a 
“Chevron-based unreasonableness argument” and “a Chevron review argument”). 
 258 See, e.g., Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1054 n.8 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(observing that “agencies’ one-time statutory interpretations, if lacking in precedential force 
with respect to future actions, may not warrant [Chevron] deference” because they lack legal 
force, but declining to consider the question because the parties agreed that Chevron 
applied).  
 259 See, e.g., Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 893–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 260 Lubow v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 783 F.3d 877, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 261 Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 22–23 
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) (mem.).  
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assess.”262 The Fourth Circuit’s rejection of Chevron’s waivability in Sierra 
Club was premised explicitly on its belief that Chevron is a standard of 
review.263 The Tenth Circuit, too, clearly views Chevron’s categorization and 
its waivability as potentially linked. In granting en banc review in the Aposhian 
case, that court requested briefing not only on the Chevron waiver question but 
also on whether “the Supreme Court intend[ed] for the Chevron framework to 
operate as a standard of review, a tool of statutory interpretation, or an analytical 
framework that applies where a government agency has interpreted an 
ambiguous statute,” among other questions.264 
Waiver and forfeiture both presuppose the existence of a right or privilege 
on the litigant’s part.265 Thus, to decide whether a particular right or privilege 
can be forfeited or waived, one must first determine what that right or privilege 
is—whether derived from the Constitution, a statute, an agency regulation, or 
common law. Rules of decision operationalize and effectuate those rights or 
privileges. For example, the Due Process Clause gives parties facing the 
government deprivation of a protected interest a legal right to adequate 
procedures.266 Courts apply the three-part standard of Mathews v. Eldridge to 
evaluate procedural due process claims.267 A litigant who fails to argue timely 
that an agency’s procedures violated the Due Process Clause waives or forfeits 
that claim, depriving a court of the opportunity to apply the standard of 
Mathews. The Administrative Procedure Act gives interested parties a legal 
right to adequate notice of and opportunity to comment on proposed 
regulations.268 Courts apply a logical outgrowth test to assess whether proposed 
and final regulations are too different for notice to have been adequate.269 If a 
litigant does not challenge the adequacy of an agency’s notice, it waives or 
 
 262 Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 903 F.3d 1154, 1161 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 263 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018) (“We 
therefore must independently assure ourselves that any statutory interpretation provided by 
[the agency] qualifies for Chevron review and if not, whether it is entitled to a lesser form of 
deference . . . .”). 
 264 Order at 1, Aposhian v. Barr, 958 F.3d 969 (10th Cir. 2020) (No 19-4036), 2020 WL 
5268055, at *1.  
 265 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (describing forfeiture as the 
“failure to make the timely assertion of a right”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) 
(describing waiver as the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege”); see also Waiving Chevron Deference, supra note 200, at 1523. 
 266 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (making the same point) 
(subsequent history omitted). 
 267 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333–35 (identifying three factors). 
 268 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012). 
 269 See, e.g., Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 619 F.3d 235, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(describing the logical outgrowth test for determining compliance with APA § 553(b) and 
(c)). See generally Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 
ADMIN. L. REV. 213 (1996) (describing and rationalizing the standard). 
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forfeits that claim, and the reviewing court has no occasion to apply the logical 
outgrowth test.  
Not so a standard of review. As typically understood, a standard of review 
is an instruction to a reviewing court regarding the appropriate framework or 
attitude to use in evaluating a particular claim or issue, rather than a right or 
privilege for a party to assert.270 A standard of review may be perceived as 
favoring one party over another. The arbitrary and capricious standard and the 
substantial evidence standard in in APA § 706(2), for example, both arguably 
favor the government by requiring reviewing courts to be somewhat deferential 
toward the agency’s findings.271 Standards of review are perceived as 
sufficiently significant that how they work, or which one applies, sometimes 
becomes its own separate issue or even the primary focus of a case.272 Congress 
often identifies by statute the standard of review it wants courts to apply in 
evaluating certain issues or claims.273 Ultimately, however, courts have an 
independent duty to ascertain the applicable standard of review that is 
independent of any action or inaction by the parties. In other words, standards 
of review simply are not waivable.274 
For similar reasons, one does not normally think of a party waiving or 
forfeiting a canon of construction. Courts have made clear repeatedly that they 
 
 270 See, e.g., Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 879 (10th Cir. 2009); Worth v. Tyer, 276 
F.3d 249, 262–63 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
 271 See e.g., Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (noting that the 
substantial evidence standard’s “threshold . . . is not high”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of 
the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–44 (1983) (describing the 
arbitrary and capricious standard as “narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency”). 
 272 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108–16 (1989) 
(establishing a default standard of review for certain claims under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 681–86 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (resolving at length a disagreement 
over whether substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious was the applicable standard of 
review); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2419 (2019) (elaborating while declining 
to overturn Auer deference); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221, 226–27 (2001) 
(holding that Skidmore rather than Chevron deference applies to agency interpretations that 
lack the force of law). 
 273 See Kozel, supra note 150, at 1125 (“The Supreme Court has left no doubt that 
specific interpretations of statutory provisions receive a unique, elevated form of deference 
going forward.”). 
 274 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(citing several circuits for “parties cannot waive the proper standard of review by failing to 
argue it”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ward v. Stephens, 777 F.3d 250, 257 n.3 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (“A party cannot waive, concede, or abandon the applicable standard of review.”); 
Gardner, 568 F.3d at 879 (holding that the standard of review is an “unavoidable legal 
question” that the court “must ask, and answer, in every case”); Worth, 276 F.3d at 262–63 
n.4 (“[T]he court, not the parties, must determine the standard of review, and therefore, it 
cannot be waived.”). 
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need not depend on a party to raise a particular canon before using it,275 nor are 
courts bound by parties’ arguments regarding the best tools and methods for 
resolving statutory meaning.276 Correspondingly, canons of construction are not 
precedential.277 Hence, it has been suggested that Chevron and waiver are an 
“awkward conceptual fit.”278  
Still, the cases and commentary to date mostly dance around rather than 
squarely addressing the implications of Chevron’s categorization for the waiver 
question. James Durling and E. Garrett West contend that Chevron should not 
be waivable whether one categorizes it as a canon, a standard of review, or a 
“precedent,” but they do not consider the implications of a Chevron rule of 
decision.279 Jeremy Rozansky seems mostly to assume that Chevron is a 
standard of review.280 An unsigned student note in the Harvard Law Review 
acknowledged that standards of review are not waivable because they represent 
claims that are not rights or privileges, but then compared Chevron to canons of 
construction.281  
Rules of decision, standards of review, and canons of construction each 
come with a set of precedents, understandings, and first principles surrounding 
their waiver as well as their application. Failing to grapple with Chevron’s 
proper categorization makes it difficult to know which collection of precedents, 
understandings, and first principles to apply in evaluating the question of 
Chevron waiver.  
B. Stare Decisis and Overturning Chevron 
Even more fundamentally, how we categorize Chevron may make a 
difference in how we think about calls from Chevron’s critics to overturn the 
doctrine. In this regard, when one contemplates the possibility of overturning 
Chevron, two particular questions follow: First, how do stare decisis principles 
 
 275 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 
1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“We . . . would give no mind to a litigant’s failure to 
invoke interpretive canons such as expressio unius or constitutional avoidance even if she 
intentionally left them out of her brief.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) (mem.). 
 276 See id.; see also Durling & West, supra note 205, at 190; Gary Lawson, Stipulating 
the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1209 (2011); cf. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 
U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not 
limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the 
independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”). 
 277 See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (“[C]anons are not 
mandatory rules.”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001) (“Canons 
of construction need not be conclusive and are often countered, of course, by some maxim 
pointing in a different direction.”); see also Kozel, supra note 150, at 1127–28. 
 278 Guedes, 920 F.3d at 22. 
 279 Durling & West, supra note 205, at 188. 
 280 Rozansky, supra note 27, at 1958–59 n.158 (discussing the implications of Congress 
failing to codify Chevron as a standard of review). 
 281 Waiving Chevron Deference, supra note 200, at 1527–28. 
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apply to the Chevron doctrine? And second, what would it mean to “overrule” 
Chevron?  
The principle of stare decisis is deceptively simple. It presumes that courts 
should abide by their prior decisions to promote fairness, predictability, and 
stability in the law.282 Stare decisis takes on “enhanced force” in the context of 
statutory interpretation, because Congress can correct the judiciary’s 
mistakes.283 But the Supreme Court has described stare decisis as a “principle 
of policy”284 rather than “an inexorable command.”285 Randy Kozel has 
described the process of deciding whether to adhere to precedent in a particular 
case as “essentially indeterminate,”286 but the Court traditionally has recognized 
several factors as relevant: the quality of the precedent’s reasoning; the 
workability of the rule or standard established by the precedent; the precedent’s 
consistency (or lack thereof) with related decisions; legal developments since 
the precedent in question was decided, including changed understandings of the 
underlying facts; and the effect of overruling the case on legitimate reliance 
interests.287  
Several observations about these factors are particularly relevant when 
thinking about overturning Chevron. First, although Chevron and other 
 
 282 See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019); Kimble v. Marvel 
Entm’t, L.L.C., 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (citation omitted); Alleyne v. United States, 570 
U.S. 99, 118 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991).  
 283 Kimble, 576 U.S. at 456. In this regard, the Court in Kimble cited Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989), which Congress subsequently 
superseded by statute, as illustrative. See Kimble, 576 U.S. at 456; see also CBOCS West, 
Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 449–51 (2008) (documenting this history). But see Gamble, 
139 S. Ct. at 1987–88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning the “legal (as opposed to 
practical) basis for applying a heightened version of stare decisis to statutory-interpretation 
decisions”). 
 284 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010) (quoting 
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)); Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (same); Boys Mkts., 
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970) (same).  
 285 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2478 (2018) (citing several cases for this language). 
 286 Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 
414 (2010). 
 287 See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (listing factors); 
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (same); Janus, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2478–79 (same). One source suggests that changed understandings of the facts underlying 
a precedent may be another factor. See BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R45319, THE SUPREME COURT’S OVERRULING OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT 17–18 
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45319.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z5G-6WUZ]. The Court 
seems to have taken into account changes in facts on the ground when it overturned precedent 
in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097–98 (2018) (emphasizing “the present 
realities of the interstate marketplace”). But contemporary Court decisions discussing stare 
decisis principles have not recognized this factor as such. 
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decisions explain at length the justifications for deference,288 the quality of that 
reasoning may be in the eye of the beholder. But poor quality of reasoning alone 
is usually insufficient to overrule a precedent.289 The Court generally will not 
overrule even a poorly-reasoned precedent unless it concludes that the precedent 
reached the incorrect result. After all, overruling a precedent generally entails 
adopting a different rule or principle that would have yielded the opposite result 
in the prior case.290 And, in this regard, the Court may take note of whether the 
precedent was the result of a less-than-full vetting of the arguments291 or the 
product of a sharply divided Court.292  
Second, a precedent’s rule or standard is “unworkable” when it fails to 
provide sufficient guidance to lower courts and others interpreting and applying 
it.293 If a rule leaves lower courts with too much discretion, thereby leading to 
unpredictable and inconsistent case outcomes, the Court can justify abandoning 
it. For example, in National League of Cities v. Usery, the Supreme Court held 
that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the 
working conditions of state employees when those employees performed 
activities in “areas of traditional governmental functions.”294 Later concluding 
that there was no reliable basis for distinguishing between “traditional” and 
“nontraditional” government functions, the Court abandoned the Usery test and 
held that Congress could impose wage and hour requirements that applied to 
state employees.295 Disagreements over how Chevron operates and when it 
applies complicate Chevron and leave it susceptible to claims that it is 
unworkable. Irrespective of Chevron, however, disagreements over methods 
and tools of statutory interpretation complicate that task.296 How much 
complexity is attributable to Chevron as opposed to the milieu in which it 
functions is debatable. 
 
 288 See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
980–82 (2005) (describing and justifying Chevron deference); United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001) (same); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (same).  
 289 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (“[A] decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the 
belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.”). 
 290 See, e.g., Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
 291 See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 709 n.6 
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 292 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828–29 (1991); cf. Gamble v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1990 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 293 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009). 
 294 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). 
 295 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530–31 (1985) 
(subsequent history omitted). 
 296 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 29–54 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2014) (offering thoughts on statutory interpretation methods); Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 
2134–62 (reviewing and responding to Judge Katzmann’s book); Katzmann, supra note 40, 
at 388–98 (responding to Justice Kavanaugh’s review). 
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In addition to how one evaluates Chevron in accordance with the various 
factors, however, how one categorizes Chevron ought to be relevant as well. 
Rules of decision seem to fit most naturally within the stare decisis framework. 
In theory, rules provide for a clear outcome given a set of factual predicates. 
Their mandatory nature makes them particularly likely to create significant 
reliance interests. And it is fairly easy to understand what it means to overturn 
a rule: Under the relevant precedent, a given set of facts should lead to outcome 
A, but the Court rejects that precedent and adopts a rule that results in outcome 
B instead. Most of those calling for Chevron to be overruled seem to conceive 
of the doctrine as a rule of decision.297 If that is correct, the Court would 
presumably recognize the same stare decisis protections and apply the same 
factors that attend any other legal rule in deciding whether to overturn it. 
At the other end of the spectrum are interpretive canons, which generally 
are thought to lack precedential value.298 While there is an ongoing debate over 
whether interpretive methodologies should receive stare decisis effect, there is 
broad agreement that at present they do not.299 Instead, canons provide a 
methodological tool that courts may or may not choose to apply in the 
appropriate circumstances. While courts often apply them only after 
ascertaining a particular trigger, such as ambiguity, nothing obligates them to 
do so.300 One justice may be more or less likely to rely on a particular canon 
than another, but methodological commitments usually do not bind future 
courts.301 Because canons are not precedential, do not bind courts, and 
frequently do not by themselves determine case outcomes,302 “overruling” a 
canon as opposed to simply not using it makes little sense.  
Many who place Chevron in the category of canon suggest that Chevron is 
not entitled to stare decisis effect at all. Raso and Eskridge argue that, because 
Chevron is a canon, it is “not a precedent,”303 identifying several features that 
make canons incompatible with a “rule-based stare decisis.”304 Because the 
general regulated public may care more about the meaning of a statute than the 
interpretive methodology that leads to that result, overruling a component of 
that methodology likely does not implicate any reliance interests. And because 
 
 297 See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(criticizing Chevron as a source of “reflexive deference”); Beerman, supra note 30, at 785 
(describing Chevron as a “judge-made rule”). 
 298 See Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1765–66 (discussing the differences 
between canons and precedents). 
 299 Compare Gluck, supra note 32, at 1765–66, with Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, 
Essay, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1575–76 (2014). For 
further discussion, see Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teaches Us About the Rest 
of Statutory Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 613–14 (2014). 
 300 See Gluck, supra note 299, at 613 & 613 n.26. 
 301 See id.; see also Kozel, supra note 150, at 1127–28. 
 302 See Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 42, at 68 (“[Canons] are merely a factor to 
be considered, or a tiebreaker in close cases.”). 
 303 Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1727. 
 304 Id. at 1810. 
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statutory interpretation encompasses a cluster of competing and potentially 
inconsistent values, a clean-cut stare decisis analysis may not even be 
possible.305 Randy Kozel takes this point a step further, arguing that Chevron is 
an interpretive methodology such that one Justice cannot bind a future 
Justice.306  
Standards of review fall somewhere in the middle. They are binding in the 
sense that a court must identify and apply the appropriate standard of review in 
each case.307 The Supreme Court can and often will remand a case for 
reconsideration based on a lower court’s failure to apply the correct standard of 
review.308 But the significant variation and malleability with which courts apply 
standards of review, as well as the difficulty in determining whether a standard 
of review is outcome determinative, undermine the binary choice that is usually 
involved in deciding whether or not to overrule a precedent. 
In practice, courts have tended to adjust and clarify the meaning of standards 
of review over time rather than to overrule and replace them. Consider, for 
example, the substantial evidence standard for reviewing agency factfinding.309 
The Supreme Court long ago articulated the boilerplate expression of what 
constitutes substantial evidence, describing it as “more than a mere scintilla. It 
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”310 Over the years, applying the standard in case after 
case, the courts have operationalized that boilerplate, yielding an extensive 
jurisprudence with detailed understandings and exceptions for what is and is not 
substantial evidence.311  
If a standard of review derives from common law rather than statutory text, 
then of course the Supreme Court can overrule the standard and replace it with 
 
 305 See id. 
 306 Kozel, supra note 150, at 1128–29. 
 307 See, e.g., U.S. Tobacco Coop. Inc. v. Big S. Wholesale of Va., LLC, 899 F.3d 236, 
256 n.6 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is always the duty of our court to apply the proper standard of 
review . . . without regard to the . . . parties’ arguments or their agreements to the 
contrary.”); Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 879 (10th Cir. 2009) (observing that “the 
correct standard of review . . . is . . . an unavoidable legal question we must ask, and answer, 
in every case”). 
 308 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016) 
(remanding for reconsideration using de novo review rather than Chevron) (subsequent 
history omitted); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 238–39 (2001) (remanding for 
reconsideration using the Skidmore standard rather than Chevron). 
 309 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012). 
 310 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951); see also NLRB v. 
Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (using virtually identical 
language prior to congressional adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act). 
 311 See, e.g., Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1155–57 (2019) (holding that an 
expert’s refusal to provide her data did not prevent her testimony from qualifying as 
substantial evidence); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971) (holding that hearsay 
can constitute substantial evidence); Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488 (holding that 
substantial evidence requires consideration of the whole record); see also HICKMAN & 
PIERCE, JR., supra note 206, § 10.2, at 1082–1105 (documenting cases). 
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something else.312 But many standards of review are statutory, meaning that 
Congress can replace them but the Court cannot.313 Yet, the statutory 
requirement is naught but the label—e.g., the use of a phrase like substantial 
evidence or arbitrary and capricious.314 The real meat of any statutory standard 
of review lies in the judicially-developed boilerplate and operational details.315 
Thus, even with a statutory standard of review, courts have a fair degree of 
latitude in adjusting over time the details that operationalize the standard. It is 
harder to conceptualize overruling a mood that is difficult to capture in words 
in the first place. Overturning the label may shift the rhetoric but perhaps not 
quite the mood. That malleability may be why courts more typically alter 
standards of review through iterative clarification rather than replacement.  
IV. CHEVRON IS A STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Chevron is a multifaceted doctrine, often applied inconsistently, and thus 
readily susceptible to being categorized in several ways simultaneously—
especially when the categories themselves are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. The Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence is sufficiently variable 
that one can find examples to support almost any reasonable characterization of 
the doctrine. Case law provides plenty of evidence to support describing 
Chevron as a rule of decision or a canon of construction. Nevertheless, we are 
convinced that, when categorizing Chevron might matter, Chevron is best 
considered a standard of review.  
Part of our reasoning for categorizing Chevron as a standard of review is 
simply impressionistic, based on our comparison of Chevron cases with the 
categorical alternatives as we understand them and have explained them in this 
Article. Too indeterminate to be a rule of decision, yet too dominant to be a 
canon of construction, Chevron best resembles a standard of review by 
providing a framework for judicial analysis of challenges to the validity of 
agency statutory interpretations and describing the proper judicial attitude when 
statutory text and traditional interpretive methods fail to provide clear answers. 
Casting Chevron as a rule of decision discounts, and thus discourages, all of the 
questions and analysis Mead and Chevron together contemplate before a court 
defers. Treating Chevron as a canon of construction renders it optional and risks 
 
 312 Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 371 
(1997) (“Precedents can be overruled just as legislators and statutes can be changed.”). 
 313 E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). 
 314 Williams v. Commonwealth, Real Estate Bd., 698 S.E.2d 917, 930 (Va. Ct. App. 
2010) (determining arbitrary and capricious actions as “willful and unreasonable” or without 
“determining principle” from prior case law as opposed to the Virginia Statute) (quoting Sch. 
Bd. of Norfolk v. Wescott, 492 S.E.2d 146, 150 (Va. 1997)). 
 315 See, e.g., Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of 
Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 248–49 (2009) (“[W]hen the language of the 
standard itself is vague, courts are more likely to define the standard, heaping on qualifiers 
and explanations so that it becomes more convoluted over time.”). 
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judicial intrusion into a policymaking space that judges are ill equipped to 
occupy. 
Nevertheless, our view that Chevron is a standard of review is informed as 
well by our perception that Chevron should be regarded as a judicial 
construction of the APA’s scope of review provision, including but not limited 
to the arbitrary and capricious standard of APA § 706(2)(A).316 As described 
above, the operational details of standards of review often evolve as courts apply 
them to many cases over time. As explained below, changes in administrative 
law doctrine and agency rulemaking practices in the late 1960s and 1970s gave 
agencies greater latitude to exercise policymaking discretion through 
rulemaking. Chevron emerged as courts applied APA § 706—admittedly more 
implicitly than explicitly—in evaluating challenges to agency regulations 
adopted under these contemporary conditions. The Supreme Court has never 
said so unequivocally, but it has danced around and implied a relationship 
between Chevron and the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard for years. If 
Chevron fits this characterization, then like the arbitrary and capricious standard 
that it construes, Chevron is both a standard of review and more anchored to 
statutory text than its detractors like to admit.  
A. Statutory Connections 
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, entitled “Scope of 
Review,” describes the role of a court reviewing agency action, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms 
of an agency action. The reviewing court shall– . . . 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found 
to be–  
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law. . . .317 
Importantly, the statute does not explain exactly what it means for agency action 
actually to be arbitrary and capricious. The terms are hardly self-defining. 
Looking them up in a dictionary offers little guidance as to their application in 
the context of judicial review of agency action.318 
 
 316 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Is Not Inconsistent with 
the APA, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/ 
nc/chevron-is-not-inconsistent-with-the-apa-by-cass-r-sunstein/ [https://perma.cc/M5LM-
74PW] (reaching a similar conclusion, although based mostly on different evidence than we 
discuss below). 
 317 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 318 See Arbitrary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Capricious, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (neither implicate judicial review of agencies). 
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The provision goes on in § 706(2)(C) to counsel reviewing courts to set 
aside agency actions that are “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right.”319 Putting that provision together with 
the flush language at the beginning of § 706, instructing reviewing courts to 
“decide all relevant questions of law” and to “interpret . . . statutory 
provisions,”320 it seems apparent that Congress intended courts rather than 
agencies to review agency statutory interpretations de novo, rather than 
deferentially.  
But what happens when traditional tools of statutory interpretation fail to 
answer the relevant interpretive question? No one seriously doubts that 
contemporary statutes confer extensive policymaking discretion on agencies.321 
Although many such statutory grants are explicit—e.g., expressly instructing 
agencies to adopt regulations to accomplish a specific, congressionally-
identified purpose322—one of Chevron’s central insights was that the line 
between statutory interpretation and policymaking discretion is not always so 
easy to draw.323 Different judges may disagree as to where that line falls, but 
most at least acknowledge that the line exists.324  
 
 319 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012). 
 320 Id. § 706(2). 
 321 Indeed, one question that divides the Justices is whether and when Congress 
delegates too much discretion to agency officials. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 
2116, 2148 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the statute at issue was “delegation 
running riot”) (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 
(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)), rehearing denied, 140 S. Ct. 579 (mem.). 
 322 See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., L.L.C. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142, 2144 (2016) 
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4)); Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002) 
(citing 49 U.S.C. § 11506(c)(1) (1994)); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 79 
(2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12116); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 525 & 525 n.2, 528 
(1990) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(a) & 1383(d)(1) (1982, Supp. V)). 
 323 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather 
than explicit.”); see also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)–(b) (2012) (requiring the EPA 
Administrator to adopt national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards as 
necessary to protect public health and welfare based on specified criteria); 47 U.S.C. 
§ 251(d)(1)–(2) (2012) (requiring the FCC to adopt regulations to facilitate the availability 
of telephone service network elements to the extent “access . . . is necessary” and “failure to 
provide access . . . would impair the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide 
the services that it seeks to offer”). 
 324 Compare Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 2153–54 (arguing that judges should be most 
willing to defer to agencies when a statute uses “broad and open-ended terms like 
‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or ‘practicable,’” but should strive to find the “best 
reading” when dealing with more specific statutory provisions), with Katzmann, supra note 
40, at 398 (suggesting that Justice Kavanaugh’s approach may “not reflect appropriate 
deference to Congress”). For further discussion, see Scalia, supra note 9, at 520–21 
(discussing what it means for a statute to be ambiguous). But see Raymond M. Kethledge, 
Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 323 (2017) (“I personally have never had occasion to reach 
Chevron’s step two in any of my cases . . . .”). 
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At this point, it is useful to recall that the standards of the APA’s scope of 
review provision are not mutually exclusive but rather are understood to be 
cumulative.325 Agency exercises of policymaking discretion typically fall under 
the purview of the APA § 706(2)(A) arbitrary and capricious standard, which is 
deferential and does not allow a court to substitute its own judgment for that of 
the agency.326 It is fairly obvious that agency actions that exceed statutory 
authority correspondingly are not in accordance with law, and thus are arbitrary 
and capricious.327 But agency actions that do not exceed statutory authority as 
a matter of mere interpretation still can be arbitrary and capricious and thus must 
be set aside as well.328 Wherever the precise line between statutory 
interpretation and policymaking discretion falls, when traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation fail and policymaking takes over, the arbitrary and 
capricious standard comes into play. 
The Supreme Court has never fully articulated this analysis, but it has hinted 
at it (or more) on a number of occasions.329 In the Chevron opinion itself, the 
Court did not cite APA § 706, but it used language evocative of that provision. 
In describing Chevron’s second step, the Court spoke of legislative regulations 
adopted pursuant to express delegations of authority as “given controlling 
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute”330—language not precisely aligned with APA § 706(2)(A), but not far 
 
 325 See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (making this observation); Olenhouse v. 
Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1575 n.25 (10th Cir. 1994) (same).  
 326 See, e.g., Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019) (describing 
the arbitrary and capricious standard in these terms) (subsequent history omitted); Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) 
(same); Atl. Tele-Network, Inc. v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1384, 1388–89 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 327 See, e.g., Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 928 F.3d 1041, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
(treating § 706(2)(A), § 706(2)(C), and Chevron as synonymous in this context); Nw. Envtl. 
Advocates v. U.S. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Emily Hammond 
Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1733 
(2011) (“Although these standards differ in their phrasing, each attempts to pair judicial 
deference with a reasoned decisionmaking requirement.”). 
 328 Cf. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517–18, 521–23 (2009) (concluding that the 
statute was ambiguous but remanding without evaluating the reasonableness of the agency’s 
interpretation because the agency had based its action on its belief that the statute was 
unambiguous); Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139, 1149–51 (9th Cir. 
2013) (same); Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350, 
1353–55 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (collecting circuit cases in support of this proposition).  
 329 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, L.L.C. v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016) (citing 
APA § 706 in conjunction with Chevron) (subsequent history omitted); Smiley v. Citibank 
(S.D.), N. A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (same); Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Dep’t of 
Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 98–99 (1999) (citing APA § 706 in conjunction with Chevron) 
(subsequent history omitted); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 316–17 
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Chevron is consistent with APA § 706). 
 330 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
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from it, either.331 In describing Chevron deference more generally, the Court 
has frequently used the same or similar phrasing,332 and not just with respect to 
legislative regulations.333 Moreover, in discussing delegations that are “implicit 
rather than explicit,” the Court in Chevron spoke of deferring to “reasonable” 
interpretations.334 The Court often has used the word “reasonable” or 
derivations thereof as representing the opposite of arbitrary and capricious, not 
only in describing Chevron step two335 but also in its discussions of APA 
§ 706(2)(A) more generally.336  
In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court again described certain agency 
actions as being worthy of deference of Chevron step two unless they are 
“procedurally defective, arbitrary and capricious in substance, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute,” and cited APA § 706(2)(A) and (D) as well as the 
Chevron opinion itself for this proposition.337 In a footnote, the Court qualified 
this proposition by observing that such deference obviously would be 
inappropriate if the interpretation at issue exceeded the agency’s jurisdiction 
under the statute, citing APA § 706(2)(C).338 
Finally, although sometimes the Court’s Chevron step two analysis seems 
focused on statutory interpretation alone,339 in several cases, the Court has more 
explicitly linked Chevron step two analysis and APA arbitrary and capricious 
review as interpreted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.340 The 
 
331 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 332 See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 524 (2014); 
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 157 (2013); Ragsdale v. Wolverine World 
Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (2002); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997); 
Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742; Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 528 (1990); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 
U.S. 154, 162 (1986). 
 333 See, e.g., ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994) (concerning 
NLRB adjudication). 
 334 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
 335 See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 395–96 (2008); United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 
U.S. 380, 383 (1999) (subsequent history omitted).   
 336 See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 
1933 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“The APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard 
requires that agency action be reasonable and reasonably explained.”); see also Arent v. 
Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (describing “whether the agency’s regulations 
were reasonable” as “a hallmark of traditional arbitrary and capricious review”).  
 337 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227. 
 338 Id. at 227 n.6. 
 339 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387–92 (1999) (rejecting 
an agency interpretation at Chevron step two for failing to give full effect to the limiting 
quality of the word “necessary”). 
 340 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 42–43 (1983) (interpreting the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard as requiring 
agencies to justify their discretionary choices contemporaneously with their actions); see 
also HICKMAN & PIERCE, JR., supra note 206, § 3.5.1 (discussing the connection at length); 
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Court in that case explained the APA § 706(2)(A) arbitrary and capricious 
standard as requiring agencies to explain and justify their discretionary choices 
contemporaneously with their actions.341 Thus, for example, in National Cable 
and Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Supreme Court 
applied Chevron to evaluate an FCC statutory interpretation, then cited both 
Chevron and State Farm in the course of concluding that the agency’s 
interpretation was reasonable and entitled to deference because the agency 
adequately explained why it chose and why it changed that interpretation.342 In 
Judulang v. Holder, although the Court analyzed the Board of Immigration 
Appeals adjudication at issue through the State Farm lens, it noted that the 
government had argued in favor of applying Chevron step two instead.343 In 
response to the government’s argument, the Court observed, “[w]ere we to do 
so, our analysis would be the same, because under Chevron step two, we ask 
whether an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”344 In 
Michigan v. EPA, the Court recognized that the terms “appropriate and 
necessary” in the Clean Air Act could support more than one reasonable 
interpretation.345 Nevertheless, citing State Farm, the Court concluded that the 
EPA’s interpretation of the statute was not “appropriate,” and thus was not 
reasonable at Chevron step two, because it failed to take adequate account of 
cost and did “significantly more harm than good.”346 And in Encino Motorcars, 
LLC v. Navarro, the Court declared that a regulation in which the Labor 
Department changed its interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act was 
ineligible for Chevron deference because it failed to justify the change, and thus 
was arbitrary and capricious.347 
To be sure, Chevron is not the only interpretation of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of APA § 706(2)(A). That standard also comes into play in 
reviewing agency findings of fact348 as well as claims that an agency has failed 
to engage in reasoned decisionmaking independent of statutory 
 
Levin, supra note 10, at 1285–86 (arguing that Chevron step two overlaps considerably with 
State Farm analysis). 
 341 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–43. 
 342 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980–82, 
986, 1000–01 (2005). 
 343 Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 & 52 n.7, 53 (2011). 
 344 Id. at 52 n.7. 
 345 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–08 (2015). 
 346 Id. at 2707, 2713–14.  
 347 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016) (subsequent 
history omitted).  
 348 See, e.g., Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FERC, 140 F.3d 1392, 1397 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(describing the substantial evidence standard as “no more than a recitation of the application 
of the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard to factual findings”) (quoting Md. People’s Counsel 
v. FERC, 761 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. 
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 682–86 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing 
the relationship between the arbitrary and capricious standard and the substantial evidence 
standard in the context of reviewing agency factual findings). 
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interpretation.349 In a sense, the arbitrary and capricious standard is a standard 
of review that carries different boilerplate descriptions for different types of 
claims brought under the APA more generally. Regardless, the arbitrary and 
capricious standard is broadly recognized as a standard of review. If Chevron is 
perceived as a construction of APA § 706, then it stands to reason that Chevron 
is a standard of review as well.  
B. Historical Grounding 
Chevron’s detractors particularly may argue that the mere ability to 
reconcile Chevron with the text of APA § 706 is inadequate reason to do so. 
Certainly, no one could argue that Congress intended to endorse Chevron as 
such when it enacted the APA, since the Court did not decide Chevron until 
decades later.350 Also, the Court has been less than clear in explaining the 
connection between the APA and Chevron. Meanwhile, judges and legal 
scholars have described the Chevron doctrine as all of revolutionary,351 
accidental,352 and entirely judge-made353—none of which quite fits the solid 
textual connection between Chevron and the APA we suggest. All of these 
characterizations of Chevron are accurate to a point, yet none tells the complete 
story.  
 
 349 See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 
1905 (2020) (describing APA § 706(2)(A) as “requir[ing] agencies to engage in ‘reasoned 
decisionmaking’”) (citation omitted); Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. 
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2398 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring) (noting that an agency 
violates the arbitrary and capricious standard when it “flunk[s] the test of ‘reasoned 
decisionmaking’” by failing to give “a satisfactory explanation for its action”) (quoting 
Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015), and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 
139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019) (observing that APA § 706(2)(A) limits the Court “to ensuring 
that [the agency] remained ‘within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking’”) (citation 
omitted) (subsequent history omitted).  
350 See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). By comparison, the APA was adopted in 1946. See Administrative Procedure Act of 
1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237. 
 351 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE 
L.J. 969, 976 (1992) (“Justice Stevens’ opinion contained several features that can only be 
described as ‘revolutionary,’ even if no revolution was intended at the time.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 352 See, e.g., Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Comment 
on Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1377, 1379 (1997) (“After all, we have a 
‘Chevron two-step’ only because of the accident of Justice Stevens’ prose in Chevron. And 
it was clearly an accident.”). 
 353 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (“Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the 
judicial duty.”), vacated, In re Gutierrez Brizuela, No. AXXX XX3 099, 2018 WL 1756899 
(B.I.A. Jan. 4, 2018); see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial 
Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 192 (1998) (“Chevron is actually an aggressive fashioning of 
judge-made law by the Court.”). 
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For example, it is generally understood that Justice Stevens, the Chevron 
opinion’s author, did not mean to announce a major doctrinal shift.354 Justice 
Breyer, too, has suggested that “Chevron made no relevant change” to prior 
doctrine except to “focus[] upon an additional, separate legal reason for 
deferring to certain agency determinations”—i.e., congressional delegation.355 
Certainly Chevron enjoys landmark status, and the doctrine’s sheer 
pervasiveness belies the suggestion that it made no change at all. Nevertheless, 
one can see glimmers of Chevron in case law dating as far back as the 1930s, if 
not earlier.  
We do not mean to suggest that courts in the 1930s conceived of or 
anticipated Chevron as it functions today. But as we have discussed, standards 
of review evolve, with courts filling in details over time to operationalize labels 
that themselves at best convey an approximate judicial attitude or mood.356 
Indeed, the best explanation of Chevron is as an evolutionary adjustment to the 
courts’ construction of APA § 706 and the arbitrary and capricious standard, 
adopted in reaction to the rise of contemporary agency rulemaking and other 
changes in administrative law doctrine and interpretations of the APA in the late 
1960s and 1970s. 
Enacted in 1946, the APA is often described at least in part as a codification 
of existing legal understandings and administrative practices as they existed 
prior to its enactment.357 Judicial deference to agency legal interpretations was 
not a new concept when the APA was adopted.358 Courts in the early twentieth 
century recognized that statutes often left certain matters to the discretion of 
agency officials and declined to inquire too deeply into those discretionary 
actions.359 Agency actions from this period were perceived as addressing 
questions that involved a conglomeration of law, fact, and policymaking 
 
 354 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental 
Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 275–76 (2014) (summarizing the evidence that the Court 
did not believe Chevron was a major departure from prior law). 
 355 See Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 596–97 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 356 See supra Part II.B. 
 357 See, e.g., Comment, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or 
Reform?, 56 YALE L.J. 670, 673 (1947) (“In some respects [the APA] is simply a codification 
of existing law and practice[.]”); see also McNollgast, The Political Origins of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 180, 181–83 (1999) (observing that, 
“[a]ccording to most legal scholarship, the purpose of the APA was to codify and rationalize 
existing practice[s]” while arguing that Congress also “refashioned” some practices to 
accomplish political goals).  
 358 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 n.14 
(1984) (collecting cases predating the APA). 
 359 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, HANDBOOK ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 246, at 880 
(1951) (“The courts have long refused to substitute judgment on some questions which are 
analytically law, and on many questions of discretion, policy, and judgment.”); FINAL 
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. 
DOC. NO. 77-8, at 98 (1941) (recognizing “the growth of administrative rule making” due in 
part to “[t]he increasing use by Congress of ‘skeleton legislation,’ to be amplified by 
executive regulations”). 
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discretion.360 Consequently, many cases both before and immediately after the 
APA’s enactment talked about statutes conferring discretion on agency officials 
and limiting the “scope” of judicial review.361 
For example, in 1936, in AT&T Co. v. United States, the Court considered 
a challenge to FCC regulations establishing uniform accounting standards for 
ratemaking.362 The statute offered little interpretive guidance, simply 
instructing the FCC “in its discretion, [to] prescribe the forms of any and all 
accounts, records, and memoranda to be kept by carriers subject to [the] Act, 
including the accounts, records and memoranda of the movement of traffic, as 
well as of the receipts and expenditures of moneys.”363 In reviewing the FCC’s 
regulations implementing this provision, the Court described its function as 
follows: 
This court is not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of 
administrative officers who have kept within the bounds of their administrative 
powers. To show that these have been exceeded in the field of action here 
involved, it is not enough that the prescribed system of accounts shall appear 
to be unwise or burdensome or inferior to another. Error or unwisdom is not 
equivalent to abuse. What has been ordered must appear to be “so entirely at 
odds with fundamental principles of correct accounting” as to be the expression 
of a whim rather than an exercise of judgment.364  
Similarly, in 1943, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,365 in 
upholding FCC regulations governing radio chain broadcasting in the “public 
interest, convenience, or necessity” against a claim that the regulations were 
arbitrary and capricious, the Court observed, 
If this contention means that the Regulations are unwise, that they are not likely 
to succeed in accomplishing what the Commission intended, we can say only 
that the appellants have selected the wrong forum for such a plea. . . . Our duty 
is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was based upon 
findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority granted 
 
 360 DAVIS, supra note 359, § 246, at 885 (recognizing a “large group of cases in which 
courts withhold substitution of judgment on non-factual issues involv[ing] what is variously 
denominated discretion, policy, or judgment”). 
 361 See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944); Fed. 
Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 276–77 (1933); United 
States v. Williams, 278 U.S. 255, 257–58 (1929); Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.S. 
221, 225 (1924); Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 215 U.S. 452, 470 
(1910).  
 362 Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T) v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 235 (1936). 
 363 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 220(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1078 (1934). 
 364 AT&T, 299 U.S. at 236–37 (quoting Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U.S. 
423, 444 (1913)). 
 365 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
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by Congress. It is not for us to say that the “public interest” will be furthered 
or retarded by the [Regulations].366 
In both of these instances, the FCC’s authority was not unlimited. It is 
axiomatic that agencies may not exceed their statutory jurisdiction, so any 
regulations the FCC adopted had to be consistent with the text, history, and 
purpose of the applicable statute.367 But within those statutory boundaries, the 
agency obviously enjoyed tremendous latitude in deciding what rules to adopt. 
Traditional tools of statutory interpretation offered little guidance regarding 
those details. There was no one right or even best interpretation of the statute in 
that regard, only policy choice. And, as with anything else, reasonable people 
could disagree over the merits of the choices made, as they did in these cases.368 
When traditional statutory interpretation ran out, in the face of a clear delegation 
of policymaking discretion from Congress to the agency, the only option for the 
Court was assessing reasonableness and then deferring to the FCC’s reasonable 
regulations. 
Recognizing this reality, in discussing judicial review particularly of agency 
rulemaking under the then-newly-enacted APA, Kenneth Culp Davis in 1951 
described a “difference between delegated administrative power and 
administrative power which is subordinate to independent judicial action.”369 
He contended that difference was “the same as that between legislative rules and 
interpretative rules,”370 with the former involving the exercise of agency 
discretion and the latter representing mere interpretation.371  
As late as 1977, in Batterton v. Francis, the Supreme Court recognized this 
same distinction.372 The case concerned the validity of a legislative regulation 
promulgated pursuant to an express statutory grant of authority to establish 
standards, in this instance defining the term “unemployment” for purposes of 
determining eligibility for certain welfare payments.373 Citing the AT&T case 
from 1936 as well as APA § 706(2)(A) and (C), the Court acknowledged,  
 
 366 Id. at 224. 
 367 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43, 843 
n.9 (1984) (recognizing that agencies and courts both “must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress” and citing several cases spanning fifty years); see also INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (“Executive action under legislatively delegated 
authority that might resemble ‘legislative’ action in some respects . . . is always subject to 
check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it . . . .”). 
 368 See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 209 (documenting the dispute over the merits 
of the agency’s regulations); AT&T, 299 U.S. at 236 (describing the particular accounting 
method choices under challenge). 
 369 DAVIS, supra note 359, § 249, at 899. 
 370 Id.  
 371 Id. § 249, at 899–900. 
 372 Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424–26 (1977). 
 373 Id. at 418 n.2, 425 (describing the question at issue and quoting the relevant statutory 
text).  
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In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the 
courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term. In 
exercising that responsibility, the Secretary adopts regulations with legislative 
effect. A reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations simply 
because it would have interpreted the statute in a different manner. 
The regulation at issue in this case is therefore entitled to more than mere 
deference or weight. It can be set aside only if the Secretary exceeded his 
statutory authority or if the regulation is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”374 
In a footnote, the Court went on to note, by contrast, that it was not required to 
give such consideration to “interpretative regulations,” which it described as 
“administrative interpretations” eligible only for “[v]arying degrees of 
deference . . . based on such factors as the timing and consistency of the 
agency’s position, and the nature of its expertise.”375 
Aditya Bamzai has offered a different historical account that would seem to 
contradict this story. Bamzai argues that both the Supreme Court in Chevron 
and scholarly defenses of the Chevron doctrine misconstrued nineteenth century 
cases cited in the Chevron decision as supporting judicial deference to agency 
legal interpretations.376 He also contends that Congress sought with the APA to 
curtail any such deference to agency legal interpretations based on “technical 
competence” or “specialized knowledge.”377 Bamzai may be right about 
nineteenth century case law and the extent to which courts were willing to defer 
to agency interpretations of statutes that could be evaluated using traditional 
interpretive methods and tools. But his account overemphasizes the distinction 
between questions of law and questions of fact, with little to no attention to early 
twentieth century recognition of a third category of question based on 
congressional delegation and agency exercises of policymaking discretion.378 It 
is this third category that, as described above, is reflected in the APA 
 
 374 Id. at 425–26 (citation omitted). 
 375 Id. at 425 n.9 (distinguishing legislative regulations adopted under specific grants of 
rulemaking power from interpretative regulations given more limited deference under 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) and other like cases). 
 376 Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 
YALE L.J. 908, 912–14 (2017). 
 377 Id. at 985–86 (quoting FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 246–47 (1941)). 
 378 See id. at 971–76. John Dickinson, on whose work Bamzai relies heavily, 
acknowledged this third category of question but gave it minimal attention, perhaps because 
such explicit agency discretion was less widespread when he wrote than after the New Deal. 
See JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 160–63 (1927) (describing the discretion extended to the ICC by the 
Hepburn Act, and judicial reluctance to interfere in ICC exercises of such discretionary 
authority). Later, the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, which 
Bamzai also discusses, recognized questions of discretion uncritically in discussing judicial 
review of agency rulemaking. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 116–17 (1941). 
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§ 706(2)(A) arbitrary and capricious standard. And it is this third category that 
Chevron acknowledges and captures with its two steps as well as its citation of 
cases like AT&T, National Broadcasting, and Batterton, which Bamzai does not 
address.379  
Bamzai’s analysis also fails to take into account several doctrinal trends 
regarding agency rulemaking that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s and set the 
stage for Chevron. For the first few decades of the APA, agencies did not adopt 
broadly-sweeping regulations often, instead either preferring or believing 
themselves limited to case-by-case adjudication as a means of articulating 
policy-driven interpretations of statutes.380 Partly this reluctance may have been 
the consequence of the perceived onerousness of formal rulemaking 
procedures.381 Also, however, the consensus view of legal scholars, and 
presumably of courts as well, was that the nondelegation doctrine limited 
agency authority to adopt legally-binding regulations (as opposed to lesser, 
nonbinding interpretative rules) to instances in which Congress specifically 
identified the regulations to be adopted.382  
 
 379 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 844 n.13 
(1984). See generally Bamzai, supra note 378. 
 380 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201–03 (1947) (holding that the choice 
between rulemaking and adjudication for communicating policy choices is for the agency, 
not the courts); see also Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and 
Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1145 (2001) (“Before the 
1960s agencies acted mainly through case-by-case adjudications. . . . Rulemaking by 
agencies played only a minor role in New Deal administration.”). 
 381 See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.06, at 382 
(1958) (quoting a Food and Drug Administration official as saying that formal rulemaking 
was “costly, time-consuming and not too well adapted for the job to be done” and involved 
“[e]xcessive delays, protracted proceedings and mountainous records . . . ”); Robert W. 
Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for 
Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276, 1287 (1972) 
(describing the sixteen formal rulemakings conducted by the FDA over a decade as 
“vary[ing] from unnecessarily drawn out proceedings to virtual disasters” with “drawn out, 
repetitious and unproductive” hearings); Nicholas Johnson, The Second Half of 
Jurisprudence: The Study of Administrative Decisionmaking, 23 STAN. L. REV. 173, 197 
(1970) (reviewing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY 
INQUIRY (1969)) (describing formal rulemaking as “often less efficient than adjudication” as 
well as “procedurally more cumbersome, consum[ing] more agency resources, and . . . more 
susceptible to delaying tactics by the parties”). 
 382 See, e.g., Ellsworth C. Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 
COLUM. L. REV. 252, 259–61 (1940); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules—
Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 928–29 (1948); see also 
Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial 
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1566–67 (2006) (documenting this consensus). 
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Agency rulemaking expanded dramatically starting around the late 
1960s.383 The nondelegation doctrine by then was perceived as moribund.384 
Agencies began asserting that statutory provisions granting more generalized 
rulemaking authority gave them the power to adopt more of their interpretations 
as legally-binding regulations.385 Congress also adopted new statutes conferring 
additional discretionary authority on agencies.386 Meanwhile, the Supreme 
Court’s 1973 decision in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway387 
curtailed sharply the applicability of the APA’s formal rulemaking procedures, 
making it easier for agencies to adopt legislative regulations.388 Academics 
objected to formal rulemaking as too procedurally onerous but otherwise 
highlighted several benefits of rulemaking over adjudication for communicating 
policy preferences.389  
 
 383 See, e.g., 1 HICKMAN & PIERCE, JR., supra note 206, § 1.6, at 40 (“Rulemaking began 
to emerge as the dominant form of regulation in the 1970s.”); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.3, at 167 (3d ed. 1991) (noting a rise in rulemaking in this period); 
Schiller, supra note 380, at 1147 (“Beginning in the 1960s federal agencies’ neglect of 
rulemaking began to decline, gradually at first and then with such speed that by the 1970s 
commentators declared that the administrative state had entered the ‘age of rulemaking.’”).  
 384 See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.2, at 150 (2d 
ed. 1978) (describing nondelegation as a failed legal doctrine); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 12, at 34 (1976) (opining that the nondelegation doctrine “can not 
be taken literally”). 
 385 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force 
of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 549–70 (2002) (documenting 
efforts by the Federal Trade Commission, Food and Drug Administration, and National 
Labor Relations Board to claim previously unasserted legislative rulemaking authority). 
 386 See, e.g., HICKMAN & PIERCE, JR., supra note 206, § 1.6, at 40 (making this 
observation and offering examples including the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
Consumer Product Safety Act, and statutes administered by the Environmental Protection 
Agency). 
 387 United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 236–37 (1973) (holding that formal 
rulemaking procedures apply only when a statute expressly requires a hearing “on the 
record”). 
 388 See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 
252–53 (2014) (“The upshot of Florida East Coast Railway is a ‘magic words’ 
requirement—‘since Florida East Coast Railway, no organic rulemaking statute that does 
not contain the specific words “on the record” has ever been held to require formal 
rulemaking.’”) (quoting Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 857 n.9 (2007)). 
 389 See, e.g., Warren E. Baker, Policy By Rule or Ad Hoc Approach—Which Should It 
Be?, 22 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 658, 660–65 (1957) (describing advantages of rulemaking 
over adjudication); Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look 
at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 
485, 513–28 (1970) (describing pros and cons of rulemaking and adjudication as varying 
depending on the circumstances but recognizing many benefits of rulemaking); David L. 
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative 
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 929–42 (1965) (reviewing the advantages of rulemaking over 
adjudication). 
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Another major doctrinal shift around this time concerned justiciability 
doctrine. In its 1967 decision in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the APA’s judicial review provisions as establishing a 
presumption in favor of pre-enforcement review of agency rules and 
regulations.390 Prior to that decision, the Court had been reluctant to consider 
challenges to the validity of agency regulations unless and until an agency 
attempted to enforce a rule in a specific case, and thereby threatened to impose 
a specific type of injury such as a fine or other legal sanction.391 After Abbott 
Labs, pre-enforcement judicial review of claims that agency regulations 
exceeded statutory authority or were otherwise arbitrary and capricious became 
the norm.392 Additionally, the Court’s 1970 decision in Association of Data 
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp relaxed statutory standing 
requirements and allowed more people to challenge the actions of agencies 
under the APA.393  
These changes in legal doctrine and administrative practice meant that, by 
the late 1970s, courts found themselves tasked more often with reviewing 
agency regulations that were sweeping in scope and doing so on a facial rather 
than an as-applied basis.394 As Reuel Schiller documented, courts familiar with 
“deploying more or less strict scrutiny” under the APA’s de novo, substantial 
evidence, and arbitrary and capricious standards of review “increase[d] the 
intensity with which they reviewed rulemaking.”395 Surveying the different 
ways to police agency rulemaking explored by the D.C. Circuit as well as 
Congress and the Administrative Conference of the United States, Schiller 
particularly linked the expansion of agency rulemaking to an activist D.C. 
Circuit’s development of “hard look review,”396 which the Supreme Court 
embraced as a construction of the arbitrary and capricious standard of APA 
§ 706(2)(A) in its 1983 State Farm decision.397 It is not difficult to imagine a 
similar evolution of APA § 706(2)(A) with Chevron, as courts grappled with the 
policymaking inherent in agencies relying on general authority rulemaking 
 
 390 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). 
 391 See, e.g., United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 77, 89 
(1947) (characterizing employee challenge to civil service rules interpreting the Hatch Act 
as a request for an advisory opinion); see also HICKMAN & PIERCE, JR., supra note 206, 
§ 17.12 (describing pre-Abbott Labs judicial approach to ripeness). 
 392 See HICKMAN & PIERCE, JR., supra note 206, § 17.14 (“After Abbott Labs, pre-
enforcement review of rules became the norm in the large class of cases in which the 
challenge to the rule’s validity raised one or more issues that were susceptible to judicial 
resolution before the rule was applied.”). 
 393 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1970); see 
also 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:9 (2d ed. 1983) 
(describing the expansion of standing doctrine). 
 394 See Schiller, supra note 380, at 1155. 
 395 Id. at 1155–56. 
 396 Id. at 1155–56, 1170. 
 397 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 42–44 (1983). 
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grants to resolve self-identified statutory ambiguities for which traditional 
interpretive tools offered no clear answer. 
C. Chevron’s Continued Evolution 
As a standard of review, it is hardly surprising that Chevron itself has 
evolved incrementally over time through various clarifications and adjustments 
as agency practices and other administrative law doctrines have changed and as 
individual cases challenging agency statutory interpretations have raised 
questions about Chevron’s domain and application piecemeal. Sometimes the 
Supreme Court has applied the Chevron doctrine more expansively, for example 
to interpretive policymaking through adjudication as well as rulemaking and to 
jurisdictional questions.398 In other instances, the Court has pared Chevron 
back, for example by rejecting it for agency actions lacking legal force399 as 
well as certain major questions.400 The Court has waffled on the significance of 
contextual factors like longevity and consistency in Chevron analysis.401 The 
debates over some of these questions can be arcane and overly complexifying.  
Justice Scalia in particular pushed for a more rule-like approach to Chevron 
in the doctrine’s early years, undoubtedly in pursuit of his general preference 
for rules over standards.402 As William Eskridge and Lauren Baer documented, 
however, Justice Scalia was among the least likely of his colleagues to actually 
defer to an agency statutory interpretation.403 He embraced a robust approach to 
Chevron step one that involved applying traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation assertively, and he suggested on at least one occasion that he 
rarely needed to defer to an agency because he had no difficulty finding statutory 
clarity.404 The fact that his colleagues were less inclined to pursue statutory 
clarity as aggressively themselves does not undermine Chevron’s categorization 
as a standard of review. If anything, as discussed, that malleability corresponds 
to characterizing Chevron in this way. 
The resulting doctrinal twists and turns perhaps make today’s Chevron a 
little or even a lot different from the Chevron of thirty years ago. The same can 
be said, however, of the State Farm approach to arbitrary and capricious review 
 
 398 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297–301 (2013). 
 399 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237–39 (2001). 
 400 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015). 
 401 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219–20, 222 (2002); Brown v. Gardner, 513 
U.S. 115, 122 (1994). See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency 
Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1823 (2015).  
 402 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 34, at 65 (describing Justice Scalia’s preference for 
rules over standards and offering six reasons why). 
 403 See Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 84, at 1154. 
 404 Scalia, supra note 135, at 520–21. 
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or the substantial evidence standard, both of which the Supreme Court has 
continued to clarify and refine.405  
The Court’s frequent failure to signal that Chevron provides the appropriate 
standard of review, or even to mention Chevron at all in some cases when its 
application might seem appropriate, does not negate Chevron’s categorization 
as such.406 As Frederick Liu has observed, “when the statute’s meaning is clear, 
the choice among Chevron, Skidmore, or some other standard is moot—which 
probably explains why, in the majority of cases the Court hears in which an 
agency construction is available, the Court declines to invoke any deference 
regime whatsoever.”407  
V. CONCLUSION 
Where does this leave us? Courts and litigants struggle with Chevron in part 
because they cannot agree about how Chevron works or the circumstances in 
which Chevron ought to apply. Categorizing Chevron as a standard of review 
will not answer every question that arises about the doctrine nor is it likely to 
make a difference in most cases. This Article does not claim to sweep so widely. 
Nevertheless, contemplating Chevron’s categorical alternatives provides a 
theoretical starting point for resolving at least some of Chevron’s issues.  
Categorizing Chevron gives courts facing certain issues a coherent baseline 
for their analysis, rather than forcing them to struggle ad hoc with every new 
debate. At present, waiver and stare decisis are the most obvious Chevron 
questions that may be informed by the insights of this Article. Standards of 
review cannot be waived, so if Chevron is a standard of review, it is not 
waivable. If Chevron is a standard of review because it is a construction of the 
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, then the Court seems more likely to 
clarify and refine it than to overturn it entirely.  
Categorizing Chevron as a standard of review, rather than as a rule of 
decision or a canon of construction, turns the doctrine’s pervasiveness and 
malleability into strengths rather than weaknesses and best recognizes and 
effectuates the premises that gave rise to Chevron in the first place. Properly 
understood as a standard of review and as an interpretation of APA § 706, 
Chevron respects the traditional role of the courts by allowing them to use the 
 
 405 See, e.g., Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569, 2574–76 (2019) 
(rejecting “pretextual” or “contrived reasons” as adequate for reasoned decisionmaking 
under § 706(2)(A) and State Farm); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1155–56 (2019) 
(concluding that the testimony of an expert witness who refuses to disclose the data 
supporting her testimony can be substantial evidence); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009) (rejecting “heightened” review under State Farm and the arbitrary 
and capricious standard when an agency changes its mind). 
 406 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 
789, 789–90 (2020) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., statement) (noting that the Court “has often 
declined to apply Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it”). 
 407 Liu, supra note 195, at 335 n.302. 
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full range of methods and tools to interpret statutory text and find statutory 
meaning. But Chevron also reminds the courts that they are not the sole source 
of wisdom in our current system of governance. As long as Congress continues 
to delegate significant policymaking discretion to agencies, courts must be leery 
of intruding too deeply into the policy sphere under the guise of interpretation. 
Categorizing Chevron as a standard of review should help the courts maintain 
that proper balance. 
 
